The standard firm heterogeneity model of FDI considers the case whole ownership foreign affiliates. However, there exist many partially-owned This paper builds a based on Helpman et al. (2004) to allow various structures and posits some testable hypotheses relationship between productivity shares/structures. empirical part corroborates these hypotheses, showing that high firms tend have higher ...

We develop an economic model that relaxes assumptions in Property Rights Theory to allow for investment in innovation that can benefit both client and vendor in an IT outsourcing relationship. Our model offers an explanation for the empirically observed heterogeneity in asset ownership structure. We find that optimal ownership structure can vary due to the different incentives of the client and...

We provide measures of absolute and relative equity agency costs for corporations under different ownership and management structures. Our base case is Jensen and Meckling's (1976) zero agency-cost firm, where the manager is the firm’s sole shareholder. Utilizing a sample of 1,708 small corporations from the FRB/NSSBF database, we find evidence supporting several predictions of agency cost theo...

This paper investigates the relation between the ownership structure and the performance of corporations if ownership is made multi-dimensional and also is treated as an endogenous variable. To our knowledge, no prior study has treated the corporate control problem this way. We find no statistically significant relation between ownership structure and firm performance. This finding is consisten...

In a theoretical model, we study how for-proÞt, nonproÞt, and public providers respond to a prospective payment system (similar to the DRG system used by Medicare in the United States) in a static game when costs are uncertain. For-proÞts default in high-cost states, provide minimum quality in low-cost states, and have a relatively high incentive to invest in cost reduction. Public providers, e...

This paper presents theory and evidence on horizontal industry structure, focusing on situations where plant-level scale economies are small and market power is not an issue. At issue is the question: what makes industries necessarily fragmented? The theoretical model distinguishes between the structure of brands and firms in an industry by examining trade-offs associated with affiliation and i...

We analyze the determinants of ownership structure in firms when conflicts of interest on risk arise endogenously via different ownership stakes and firm decisions are made through majority voting. A large block is chosen to incentivize monitoring. Because a large blockholder holds a large share of the firm, he is averse to risky investing. This generates a conflict of interest with dispersed s...

Income tax is one of the most important costs of companies and it is usually considered as a cost that should not be paid. One of the most noticeable and influential factors in tax avoidance is corporate ownership structure. With an emphasis on institutional ownership and its types in this paper, it is attempted to measure the effect of this ownership and its types on corporate tax avoidance. F...

The study seeks to examine the effect of equity ownership structure on firm financial performance in South Korea. I focus on the role of two main dimensions of the ownership structure: Ownership concentration (i.e., the distribution of shares owned by majority shareholders) and identity of owners (especially, foreign investors and institutional investors). Using panel data for South Korea in 20...