Mental causation is a philosophical concept attempting to describe the causal effect of the immaterial mind on subjectś behavior. Various types of causality have different interpretations in the literature. I propose and explain this concept within the framework of the reciprocal causality operating in the brain bidirectionally between local and global brain levels. While committing myself to t...

Abstract In this paper, I discuss a view proposed by Carl Hempel in his paper Reduction: Ontological and Linguistic Facets, published 1969. Here, suggested that questions regarding the identification of mental states with physiological states, relation between sociological phenomena individual behavioral biological physicochemical should be given what he calls ‘linguistic’ interpretation. His m...

Abstract I define two metaphysical positions that anti-physicalists can take in response to Jonathan Schaffer’s ground functionalism. Ground functionalism is a version of physicalism where explanatory gaps are everywhere. If true, arguments against based on the gap between physical and experiential facts fail. In response, first, argue some already safe from challenge. These reject an underlyin...

The conclusion of this argument (hereafter ZA) entails the falsity of physicalism because, technical details aside, physicalism is or entails the thesis that every psychological truth is entailed by some physical truth. If it is possible that I have a zombie duplicate however, then it is possible that the physical truths are as they are and some psychological truth is different. Hence 3 entails...

Many philosophers use “physicalism” and “naturalism” interchangeably. In this paper, I will distinguish ontological naturalism from physicalism. While broad versions of physicalism are compatible with naturalism, naturalism doesn't have to be committed to strong versions of physical reductionism, so it cannot be defined as equivalent to it. Instead of relying on the notion of ideal physics, nat...

Among the arguments that have been proposed for physicalism, “causal argument” is widely taken to be most compelling. Justin Tiehen (2015) has raised an interesting objection this argument takes form of a dilemma. Tiehen’s ultimate conclusion at best, causal circular and so its premises cannot provide support conclusion, physicalism. The aim present paper respond in order defense argument.

I survey some of the connections between the metaphysics of the relation between mind and matter, and quantum theory’s measurement problem. After discussing the metaphysics, especially the correct formulation of physicalism, I argue that two state-reduction approaches to quantum theory’s measurement problem hold some surprises for philosophers’ discussions of physicalism. Though both approaches...