In this article, we unearth the institution for enforcement of the agreement between the Opec Boys, fuel smugglers and ex-rebels, and a politician, who allows them to conduct illegal smuggling. Rather than the Opec Boys’ threat of rebellion, their promise of political support and refraining from civil disorder matters to inflict cooperation. A repeated play mechanism where the players punish ea...

Article history: Received 21 April 2008 Received in revised form 13 May 2009 Accepted 14 May 2009 Available online 27 May 2009 This paper assumes that the decision makers of OPEC (or at least of its core members) are interested in both profits and political payoffs (support, popularity, being a hero of the Arab or Islamic street, etc.). The oil weapon, i.e. a reduction of output is the most pow...

this paper investigates the impacts of economic and financial developments on environmental pollution for 6 opec countries using panel cointegration and panel long-run estimator (dols) over the period 1980–2008.  the results shows that both economic and financial development have significant effect on the environmental quality in selected opec economies. the findings not support the existence o...