In most cases, we think that what settles what act it is right to perform is sensitive to what we take the facts about the world to be. But those facts include many controversial metaphysical claims about the world. I argue that depending on what metaphysical model we take to be correct, we will have very different views about what the right actions are. In particular, I argue that if a particu...

We propose that not all such arguments are on a par. The first section of the paper distinguishes dialectically effective from dialectically ineffective arguments against metaphysical vagueness. The second section constructs an argument against metaphysical vagueness – specifically, an argument against objects that are indeterminate in what parts they have – which promises to be dialectically e...

This essay surveys the varieties of disjunctivism about perceptual experience. Disjunctivism comes in two main flavours, metaphysical and epistemological. Metaphysical disjunctivism is the view usually associated with the disjunctivist label, and whenever ‘disjunctivism’ occurs here unprefixed, it refers to this view. After some initial discussion of (metaphysical) disjunctivism (sections 1–3),...

Causal pluralism is increasingly gaining interest as a promising alternative for monistic approaches toward causation. However, although the debate is scarcely out of the egg, the term “causal pluralism” already covers diverse meanings. This creates confusion, and to remedy that confusion, it is necessary to discern different kinds of pluralistic approaches to causation and different possible p...

“justice” is a fine adjective to which various nouns may be attributed. these nouns can be divided into three universal categories: individual person, social situation, and society. each of these nouns has a particular characteristic feature based on which one may not use any given definition for justice. the purpose of this essay is to argue that taking the noun of justice into consideration i...

In Modality and Explanatory Reasoning, Boris Kment argues that a single notion of essence can be used to play two different theoretical roles. He thinks there is an important connection between essence and metaphysical necessity, on the one hand, and between essence and metaphysical explanation, on the other. It seems to me that there is a price to be paid for using a single notion of essence t...

We examine a recent argument that " identical " quantum particles with an anti-symmetric state (fermions) are weakly discernible objects, just like irreflexively related ordinary objects in situations with perfect symmetry (Black's spheres, for example). We conclude that the argument uses a silent premise that is not justified in the quantum case. 1 Individuality Objects are individuals. One mi...