INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 397 I. THE THREAT OF TPFS: EVERYONE UNDERSTANDS THE GAME EXCEPT THE CONSUMER ................................................. 398 II. CONSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS: RATIOS AND DISCLOSURES ........ 402 A. Pre-Riley: A Reasonable Compromise ............................... 402 B. Riley: Taking Away Valuab...

The paper provides a characterization of all efficient and strategy-proof voting mechamisms on a large class of preference domains, the class of all generalized single-peaked domains. It is shown that a strategy-proof voting mechanism on such a domain is efficient if and only if it satisfies a weak neutrality condition and is either almost dictatorial, or defined on a median space of dimension ...

INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................69 I. VISIONS OF THE FUTURE ..............................................................71 A. The Openists...........................................................................71 B. The Deregulationists...............................................................75 II. SHARED ECONOMIC FAIT...

LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in furthe...

One of the most puzzling aspects about the functioning of the floating exchange rate regime of the 1980s has been that huge swings in exchange rate have had only muted effects on anything real. To understand this phenomenon, we study the relationship between communism and value neutrality and monetary neutrality. We find that the symmetry of communism is bound to lead to value neutrality. In th...

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 159 I. THE CASE AND TRIPPING POINT FOR DEREGULATION ..................... 160 II. THE EXPANDED ROLE OF ANTITRUST ............................................. 165 III. “NETWORK NEUTRALITY” ............................................................. 175 CONCLUSION....................................

The document can be stored and made available to the public on the open internet pages of Aalto University. All other rights are reserved.

What it is, and how to avoid mistaking it for something else.