this paper represents a complete survey on generation companies’ (gencos’) optimal bidding strategy problem in restructured power markets. in this regard after an introduction to competitive electricity markets, concept of optimal bidding strategy is presented. considering large amount of works accomplished in this area a novel classification is implemented in order to categorize the existing d...

We study simple item bidding mechanisms for the combinatorial public project problem and explore their efficiency guarantees in various well-known solution concepts. We first study sequential mechanisms where each agent, in sequence, reports her valuation for every item in a predefined order on the agents determined by the mechanism. We show that if agents’ valuations are unit-demand any subgam...

We develop a novel auction-based algorithm to allow users to fairly compete for a wireless fading channel. We use the all-pay auction mechanism whereby user bid for the channel, during each time-slot, based on the fade state of the channel, and the user that makes the higher bid wins use of the channel. Under the assumption that each user has a limited budget for bidding, we show the existence ...

In a competitive electricity market with substantial involvement of renewable electricity, maximizing profits by optimizing bidding strategies is crucial to different power producers including conventional power plants and renewable ones. This paper proposes a game-theoretic bidding optimization method based on bi-level programming, where power producers are at the upper level and utility compa...

Supply function equilibria are used in the analysis of divisible good auctions with a large number of identical objects to be sold or bought. An important example occurs in wholesale electricity markets. Despite the substantial literature on supply function equilibria the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibria for a uniform price auction in asymmetric cases has not been established in a g...

In this article renewable energy support allocation through different types of auctions are assessed. The applied methodological framework is auction theory, based on the rules governing German photovoltaic (PV) Feed-in Premium (FIP) auctions. work focuses bidding strategies an extended levelised cost electricity (LCOE) methodology, comparing two set rules: uniform price and pay-as-bid. When ca...

This paper proposes a novel optimization algorithm Varying Population based Bacterial Foraging Algorithm (VPBFA), to solve optimal bidding strategy in a pool based electricity market. In a power market, Generating Companies (suppliers) participate in the bidding process in order to maximize their profits. Each supplier bid strategically for choosing the bidding coefficients to counter the compe...

The concept of a supply function equilibrium (SFE) has been widely used to model generators’ bidding behavior and market power issues in wholesale electricity markets. Observers of electricity markets have noted how generation capacity constraints may contribute to market power of generation firms. If a generation firm’s rivals are capacity constrained then the firm may be pivotal; that is, the...

Aggregating the Demand Response (DR) is approved as an effective solution to improve the participation of consumers to wholesale electricity markets. DR aggregator can negotiate the amount of collected DR of their customers with transmission system operator, distributors, and retailers in Demand Response eXchange (DRX) market, in addition to participate in the energy market. In this paper, a fr...

This paper characterizes equilibrium in an auction market constrained by limited capacities of links in a transportation network. The formulation is adapted to a wholesale spot market for electricity managed by the operator of the transmission system. This paper derives conditions that characterize equilibrium in an auction market of the kind conducted by system operators in the electricity ind...