We studied a two-person game regarding deforestation in human-environment relationships. Each landowner manages a single land parcel where the state of land-use is forested, agricultural, or abandoned. The landowner has two strategies available: forest conservation and deforestation. The choice of deforestation provides a high return to the landowner, but it degrades the forest ecosystem servic...

How does natural selection lead to cooperation between competing individuals? The Prisoner's Dilemma captures the essence of this problem. Two players can either cooperate or defect. The payoff for mutual cooperation, R, is greater than the payoff for mutual defection, P. But a defector versus a cooperator receives the highest payoff, T, where as the cooperator obtains the lowest payoff, S. Hen...

Understanding the emergence and sustainability of cooperation is a fundamental problem in evolutionary biology and is frequently studied by the framework of evolutionary game theory. A very powerful mechanism to promote cooperation is network reciprocity, where the interaction patterns and opportunities for strategy spread of agents are constrained to limited sets of permanent interactions part...

One of the most important questions in game theory concerns how mutual cooperation can be achieved and maintained in a social dilemma. In Axelrod's tournaments of the iterated prisoner's dilemma, Tit-for-Tat (TFT) demonstrated the role of reciprocity in the emergence of cooperation. However, the stability of TFT does not hold in the presence of implementation error, and a TFT population is pron...

Thus, in the case in question, the cooperative party will certainly be damaged. The hostile (second) party may benefit from the cooperation of the first party if and only if e 21 < e 210 or, equivalently 2 This inequality will be satisfied if and only if K2(s) is chosen such that K2(0) < 1 1 + [1 0 K 1 (0)] 2 K 1 (0)P 22 (0)G 2 (0) 1 Nevertheless, from (2) it is seen that the infimum value for ...

In this paper we show Case-based Decision Theory (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1995) can explain the aggregate dynamics of cooperation in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, as observed in the experiments performed by Camera and Casari (2009). Moreover, we find CBDT provides a better fit to the dynamics of cooperation than does the existing Probit model, which is the first time such a result has been fo...

We examine a variant of repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma whose stage game payoffs are subject to vary, and show that a payoff perturbation may strictly reduce the minimum discount factor to sustain mutual cooperation. JEL classification: C 73