We hypothesize that family firms’ dividend policies are in part determined by a consumption smoothing motive of shareholders. Our paper tests this hypothesis using Japanese tax reform 2011 which increased the rate for only some groups major In quasi-experimental setting, we find firms with non-executive shareholders, who were likely rentiers, counteracted increase increasing dividends. This beh...

In this research, we find statistically significant positive abnormal returns around takeover announcements for combined firms. The cumulative average abnormal returns for combined firms are 4.62% over the event-window [-20, +20], which suggests that takeovers create shareholder wealth (synergy motive). In addition, we examine the impact of ownership structure in target firms on the abnormal re...

This paper analyses the real economy effects of firms having some shareholders with a short investment horizon on their shareholder register. Short-term shareholders cause firms to be concerned with the path of the share price as well as its ultimate value. Such shareholders in an economy lead to bubbles in the prices of key inputs, to the misallocation of firms to risky business models, and to...

We find that annual shareholder meetings conducted online can greatly increase the participation of shareholders, especially retail shareholders. This finding is more evident when the cost of physically attending such a meeting is higher and when the firm’s ownership is more dispersed. We further document significant positive stock returns when firms initiate online annual meetings. We also fin...

In 1622, disgruntled shareholders of the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie or VOC) complained that their interests had been harmed, as the directors had entered into expensive warfare against the Spaniards. The States General had instructed the VOC directors to chase away the Spaniards from the East. The semi-public nature of the VOC was an important conflict of inter...

A (t, n) secret sharing (SS) scheme can be divided into two protocols: share generation protocol and secret reconstruction protocol. In share generation protocol, a mutually trusted dealer selects a secret and distributes shares to shareholders secretly; in secret reconstruction protocol, a group of t qualified shareholders pool their shares together to reconstruct the secret. However, in secre...

This paper incorporates a model of corporate control into a general equilibrium framework for production economies with incomplete markets. The classical objective of value maximization is extended, but is indeterminate. Instead, firms are viewed as being subject to shareholder control via some decision mechanism. As long as this decision mechanism is responsive to a unanimous preference by sha...

Managers make decisions on behalf of shareholders. In this context, financial economists have promoted executive stock options as a means to realign the incentives of managers with those of shareholders. We argue that overconfidence and optimism, which are likely to characterize managers, provide an alternative solution to this agency problem. Whereas risk-averse rational managers tend to postp...

In his latest book “Firm Commitment” Colin Mayer argues that current-shareholder value orientation leads to the exploitation of both current as well as future stakeholder groups. Drawing on research conducted throughout his entire career, Mayer asserts that market processes distort resources operating to the exploitation of stakeholders to those who have the most opportunity to use them—current...

The green innovation strategy has gradually become the key for enterprises as microeconomic entities to gain competitive advantages and adapt complex changes in external environment. Using data of A-share listed companies Shanghai Shenzhen from 2010 2020, this paper empirically explores impact specific mechanism ownership structure multiple major shareholders on enterprises. results show that, ...