In this paper, we describe which roles deep structures of law play in drafting legislation. Deep structures contain a formal description of the intended normative eeects of a new regulation. We will discuss mechanisms that can be used to generate diierent paraphrases of regulations automatically. Since it is possible to test the paraphrases on legal knowledge based systems, we have provided two...

These are years of rapid change in health care. Nurses face many challenges and have many opportunities to participate in and influence the formation of health care policy. Nurse citizens can become very effective in their lobbying efforts, whether on the federal, state, or local level, when they are armed with information about the key players and the processes and their belief in what nursing...

Previous research showed that considerable differences exist in telemedical legislation within different countries. The result points out the existence of major grasp between legislation in the USA, Europe and countries like Croatia. This article deals with analysis of chronological steps of legislation development and enactment. The focus of research is placed on enactment of legislation relat...

We experimentally investigate the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model of legislative bargaining with two player teams versus individuals. Teams pass minimum winning coalitions (MECs) significantly more often than individuals, meeting or beating the demanding truth wins norm. Teams have significantly more proposer power, and come significantly closer to the SSPE prediction. This results from proposers c...

Recent literature suggests that electoral budget cycles are a phenomenon of new rather than established democracies. What part of the democratization process explains the amelioration of the political budget cycle? We argue the answer lies (in part) in the development of a strong party system. We extend the classic Rogoff-Siebert model to show that political budget cycles are possible in a legi...

We prove existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in an infinite-horizon model of legislative policy making in which the policy outcome in one period determines the status quo in the next. We allow for a multidimensional policy space and arbitrary smooth stage utilities. We prove that all such equilibria are essentially in pure strategies and that proposal strategies are differentiable...

In this paper, we model a legislative calendar as an ordered list of issues to be considered in sequence. We present two equilibrium models of legislative scheduling, one presuming that the calendar is itself the object of collective choice and the other considering which calendars are immune from “discharge” (the change of at most one element of the calendar by a decisive coalition in the legi...

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive o...