What is distinctive about my views in epistemology? One thing is that my concern with epistemology is a concern with methodology. Furthermore, I reject psychologism about logic and reject the idea that deductive rules like modus ponens are in any way rules of inference. I accept a kind of methodological conservatism and reject methodological theories that appeal to special foundations, analytic...

Different beliefs about the nature and justification of bioethics may reflect different assumptions in moral epistemology. Two alternative views (put forward by David Seedhouse and Michael H Kottow) are analysed and some speculative conclusions formed. The foundational questions raised here are by no means settled and deserve further attention.

In this article I argue that the prevalence of intersubjective disagreement in epistemology poses a serious problem for Epistemic Externalism. I put the problem in the form of a dilemma: either Epistemic Externalism is not a complete account of epistemic justification or it’s implausible to claim that the belief that Epistemic Externalism is true is itself an externalistically justified belief.

Epistemology tout court is a philosophical inquiry into the nature of knowledge (as a product) and knowing (as a process that produces knowledge). One of the epistemologist’s goals is to separate the epistemic wheat from the doxastic chaff, the knowledge from the mere belief; another one is to describe the very nature of knowledge: its features, conditions, sources, justification and limits. Fo...

The study of scepticism might be said to define epistemology. As the enquiry into the nature and sources of knowledge, epistemology's two fold concern is to identify and explicate the conditions whose satisfaction will amount to knowledge. Familiarly, one of these crucial conditions is justification. The problems facing the justification of knowledge-claims can best and most powerfully be descr...

This paper disputes the widely held view that one cannot establish the reliability of a belief-forming process with the use of beliefs that are obtained by that very process since such self-dependent justification is circular. Harold Brown ([1993]) argued in this journal that some cases of self-dependent justification are legitimate despite their circularity. I argue instead that under appropri...