Insurers have significant flexibility in the management of claims process and degree to which they prioritize collection salvage subrogation. These decisions could materially impact financial well-being insurers as well prices paid by consumers. Given potential implications that subrogation can for insurers, consumers, regulators, we investigate relation between speed at U.S. property-liability...

The five largest US commercial health insurance companies together enroll 125 million members, or 43 percent of the country's insured population. Over the past decade these insurers have become increasingly dependent for growth and profitability on public programs, according to an analysis of corporate reports. In 2016 Medicare and Medicaid accounted for nearly 60 percent of the companies' heal...

AI and data technologies are a catalyst for fundamental changes to insurance business models. The current upheaval is seeing some incumbent insurers trying do the same more effectively, while others evolve fully utilize new capabilities users these bring. At time, technologically advanced organizations from outside sector entering disrupting it. Within this however, there signs of convergence t...

The main trigger to effect insurance cover of a claim made against the company or firm is proper notification of circumstances to insurers. Once again, many of you reading this article will not consider that there is much of an issue here. However, place yourself in the shoes of the small businessman or woman. A director is aware of an issue, which may give rise to a claim. He is caught in a di...

This paper measures welfare losses caused by adverse selection and imperfect competition in privatized Medicare. I model insurers’ premium and coverage choices in an environment where consumers with heterogeneous preferences may impose di¤erent costs on their insurers. Using insurers’ behavior and exogenous variation in market structure, I identify a causal link between consumers’types and insu...

We consider insurance markets with adverse selection and propose a mechanism under which a separating Nash equilibrium always exists (even when a Rothschild-Stiglizt equilibrium does not). This equilibrium is unique and always (interim) incentive efficient. In our setting, the Rothschild-Stiglizt equilibrium exists and coincides with ours only if the former is incentive efficient. Otherwise, ou...

This paper demonstrates health insurers’ incentives to design benefits that differentially appeal to profitable enrollees and deter unprofitable enrollees in Medicare Part D. A system of diagnosis-specific payments was meant to neutralize insurer benefit design incentives by paying insurers more for the sick than for the healthy. These diagnosis-specific payments were held steady even as treatm...