We introduce a solution concept for cooperative game with transferable utility and a coalition structure that is proportional for two-player games. Our value is obtained from generalizing a proportional value for cooperative game with transferable utility (Ortmann, 2000) in a way that parallels the extension of the Shapley value to the Owen value. We provide two characterizations of our solutio...

This paper explores the aggregation of electricity consumers flexibility. A novel coalitional game theory model for partition function games with non-transferable utility is proposed. used to formalize a in which find coalitions among themselves order trade their consumption flexibility market. Utility functions are defined enable measuring players preferences. Two case studies presented, inclu...

This paper provides a framework for implementing and comparing several solution concepts for transferable utility cooperative games. We construct bidding mechanisms where players bid for the role of the proposer. The mechanisms differ in the power awarded to the proposer. The Shapley, consensus and equal surplus values are implemented in subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes as power shifts away...

We introduce a single-valued solution concept, the so-called average covering tree value, for the class of transferable utility games with limited communication structure represented by a directed graph. The solution is the average of the marginal contribution vectors corresponding to all covering trees of the directed graph. The covering trees of a directed graph are those (rooted) trees on th...

This article studies values for cooperative games with transferable utility. Numerous such values can be characterized by axioms of Ψε-associated consistency, which require that a value is invariant under some parametrized linear transformation Ψε on the vector space of cooperative games with transferable utility. Xu et al. (2008, 2009, Linear Algebra Appl.), Xu et al. (2013, Linear Algebra App...

This article studies values for cooperative games with transferable utility. Numerous such values can be characterized by axioms of Ψε-associated consistency, which require that a value is invariant under some parametrized linear transformation Ψε on the vector space of cooperative games with transferable utility. Xu et al. (2008, 2009, Linear Algebra Appl.), Xu et al. (2013, Linear Algebra App...

This paper studies the core of combined games, obtained by summing two coalitional games. It is shown that the set of balanced transferable utility games can be partitioned into equivalence classes of component games whose core is equal to the core of the combined game. On the other hand, for non balanced games, the binary relation associating two component games whose combination has an empty ...

We propose a new notion of coalitional equilibria, the strong $$\beta$$ -hybrid solution, which is refinement hybrid solution introduced by Zhao. Zhao’s well suited to study situations where people cooperate within coalitions but compete with one another. This paper’s as opposed assigns each coalition strategy profile that strongly Pareto optimal. Moreover, like -core, deviations subcoalitions ...

This paper studies the core of combined games, obtained by summing two coalitional games. It is shown that the set of balanced transferable utility games can be partitioned into equivalence classes of component games to determine whether the core of the combined game coincides with the sum of the cores of its components. On the other hand, for non-balanced games, the binary relation associating...

We consider transferable utility cooperative games with infinitely many players and the core understood in space of bounded additive set functions. show that, if a game is below, then its non-empty only balanced. This finding generalizes Schmeidler (1967) “On Balanced Games Infinitely Many Players”, where assumed to be non-negative. also generalize Schmeidler's result case restricted cooperatio...