A well-known objection to divine will/divine command moral theories is that they commit us to the view that God’s will is arbitrary. I argue that several versions of divine will/divine command moral theories, including two of Robert Adams’s versions of the DCT and my own divine preference theory, can be successfully defended against this objection. I argue that, even if God’s preferences are so...

The paper defends a compatibilist solution to the problem of relationship between divine and human freedom. It is argued that asymmetry ability constituted by our foreknowledge influence future inability control past results from openness fixed open interpreted in terms counterfactual dependence. Therefore, if not true some types facts, then we may be able them even they are facts about past. t...

In this paper I argue that J. L. Schellenberg’s Divine Hiddenness Argument is committed to a problematic implication that is weakened by research in cognitive psychology on affective forecasting. Schellenberg’s notion of a nonresistant nonbeliever logically implies that for any such person, it is true that she would form the proper belief in God if provided with what he calls “probabilifying” e...

Theistic and atheistic beliefs respectively play a fundamental role in the definition of man's free will and moral responsibility, so far as they can determine the nature, quality, and quantity of human's freedom. After believing in God, the belief in a revealed or a non-revealed religion and the manner in which God’s attributes are interpreted play an essential role in the definition of free w...

Modern science developed within a culture of Judeo-Christian theism, and science and theism have generally supported each other. However, there are certainly areas in both science and religion that puzzle me. Here I outline some puzzles that have arisen for me concerning everlasting life, human free will, divine free will, the simplicity and probability of God, the problem of evil, and the conv...