Protection unconstrained by rules often varies substantially over time. Rules-based disciplines like OECD industrial tariff bindings negotiated under GATT since 1947 and new Uruguay Round bindings on agricultural and services trade and on developing country industrial tariffs, constrain this variability. We examine the theoretical effects of such constraints on the expected cost of protection a...

COMMERCIAL POLICY VARIABILITY, BINDINGS, AND MARKET ACCESS Joseph F. Francois and Will Martin Protection unconstrained by rules often varies substantially over time. Rules-based disciplines, like OECD industrial tariff bindings negotiated under GATT since 1947 and new Uruguay Round bindings on agricultural and services trade and on developing country industrial tariffs, constrain this variabili...

I nternational trade has become a contentious topic in many industrial democracies, including the United States. In sharp contrast to earlier periods, President Bush was barely able to secure fast track or trade promotion authority in the Trade Act of 2002. In the end, the act survived three votes in the House of Representatives, twice by a one-vote margin and once by three votes. Trade has als...

AbstractThis paper examines the impasse in the current Doha Development Round negotiations andasks how the rules of the WTO could be changed to facilitate multilateral negotiations andto increase the welfare of the Member countries. It considers possible changes to the methodof negotiation. As examples of rules which are outdated, it considers the rules relating toregional trade agreements and ...

Increased market access from Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) promised by policy makers is often diluted by preferential rules of origin (ROO). This paper discusses two policy options -one direct, and one indirect -with regard to limiting the impact of NAFTA ROO on trade, and illustrates the impact on GDP and welfare of these options using a computable general equilibrium methodology. The first (di...