Using a broad sample of the largest European companies, I examine whether the two governance mechanisms, namely (i) independent monitoring by a board of directors and (ii) grants and disclosures of incentive-based executive pay, are substitutes for one another. I find that companies with proportionately more executives on their boards of directors grant greater incentive-based pay to their exec...

Dividend policy has long been an issue of interest in the financial literature. To date, a number of studies published on agency costs and dividend policy but most of them are on developed markets, It is well known that the emerging markets are quite different from developed markets in all respects. So, the existing published evidence is of limited relevance in identifying the influence of agen...

The growing number of corporate scandals globally highlights the importance effective governance mechanisms. Many frameworks that are rooted in agency theory advocate election independent non-executive directors, an chairperson, and a lead director. Shareholder voting on or re-election directors (hereafter referred to as ‘director re-elections’) has been largely unexplored South Africa—a countr...

The world-wide inflation in executive compensation in recent years has been accompanied by an increase in the prevalence of long-term incentives. This article demonstrates how the subjectively perceived value of long-term incentives is affected by risk aversion, uncertainty aversion, and time preferences. Based on a unique empirical study which involved collecting primary data on executive pref...

Background Globally, flexible work arrangements - through the use of temporary nursing staff - are an important strategy for dealing with nursing shortages in hospitals. Objective The objective of the study was to determine the direct and indirect costs of agency nurses, as well as the advantages and the problems associated with agency nurse utilisation in two public sector hospitals in South A...