We analyze evolutionary games with replicator dynamics that have frequency dependent stage games. In such an evolutionary game, the payoffs of a strategy at any point in time are functions of the strategy shares given by the players’ strategy choices at that time. This framework is suited to model feedback effects between population variables and individual incentives, indirect network effects,...

Since the workshop held at BIRS in 2006 on the same topic, evolutionary game theory has continued to expand in the directions identified there as well as in several new directions. There seems to be a tendency to reach out from the founding concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy, towards related concepts such as continuously stable strategies and stochastically stable strategies, towards ...

Evolutionary game dynamics with two 2-strategy games in a finite population has been investigated in this study. Traditionally, frequency-dependent evolutionary dynamics are modeled by deterministic replicator dynamics under the assumption that the population size is infinite. However, in reality, population sizes are finite. Recently, stochastic processes in finite populations have been introd...