Using a long panel of roll call voting data, I find that “flip-flopping” senators face significant electoral costs when changing positions. In models of electoral competition, as the costs to candidates changing position approach zero, the equilibrium prediction is the convergence of platforms. Such convergence is at odds with empirical observation. Using a dynamic, structural model of candidat...

Abstract While a large body of literature empirically documents an electoral advantage for local candidates, the exact mechanisms accounting this effect remain less clear. We integrate theories on political geography candidate-voter relations with socio-psychological accounts citizens’ attachment, arguing that citizens vote candidates from their own communities as expression place-based identit...

In this paper we argue that the number of candidates running for public office, their ideological differentiation, and the intensity of campaign competition are all naturally intertwined, and jointly determined in response to the incentives provided by the electoral system. We propose a simple general equilibrium model that integrates these elements in a unitary framework, and provide a compari...

We examine the relationship between a candidate’s gender and their electoral success, using data from all Federal elections to the Australian House of Representatives between 1903 and 2004. Controlling for party affiliation, incumbency, expected vote share and the number of candidates on the ballot, we find that the vote share of female candidates is 0.6 percentage points smaller than that of m...

In general elections in the Republic of Ireland 1948-1997, female candidates have received on average a lower proportion of first-preference votes than males. This disparity between male and female candidates is worsening over time. Female candidates have less electoral campaign experience than male candidates, and this helps to explain the gender gap. The declining importance of the “widow’s (...

We study a model of electoral competition where voters obtain information on candidates’ platforms through campaign advertising, and word-of-mouth communication. We show that when the costs of campaign advertising are low, an increase in word-of-mouth communication among voters causes polarization. In particular, the more voters can exchange political information between each other, the more of...

In the United States electoral system, a candidate is elected indirectly by winning a majority of electoral votes cast by individual states, the election usually being decided by the votes cast by a small number of " swing states " where the two candidates historically have roughly equal probabilities of winning. The effective value of a swing state in deciding the election is determined not on...

Formal work on the electoral model often suggests that parties or candidates should locate themselves at the electoral mean. Recent research has found no evidence of such convergence. In order to explain nonconvergence, the stochastic electoral model is extended by including estimates of electoral valence. We introduce the notion of a convergence coefficient, c. It has been shown that high valu...