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Adapting methods introduced by Steven Smale, we describe good strategies for a symmetric version of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma with n players.

We consider a dynamic multi-period framework of a Cournot duopoly and introduce a simultaneous hedging and a storage opportunity to allow players to manage risk before and after demand uncertainty is realized. Decision makers face a strategic dilemma: they must weigh the advantages of dealing with their risk exposure and the disadvantages of higher competition. Due to the storage opportunity, o...

Previous studies on moral judgment have assumed that the trolley and footbridge dilemmas (Thomson, 1985) reflect utilitarian and deontologist thinking, respectively. However, on the basis of the “intervention myopia” hypothesis (Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007) and recent findings in analyses of moral dilemmas (Nakamura, 2011), the current study led a somewhat paradoxical prediction: An effect of th...

It is popular that two players face with each other repeatedly in different phases [1]. Workers usually have relationship with their colleagues not only at work but also privately. Governments make negotiations on agricultural trade in addition to industrial trade. A hotel chain competes with the rival in various areas. Do these situations facilitate cooperation? What kind of decision makings s...

Curtis H. Martin is Professor of Political Science at Merrimack College in North Andover, Massachusetts. He is co-author of Politics East and West: A Comparison of British and Japanese Political Culture (M.E. Sharpe, 1992) and author of “President Clinton’s Haiti Dilemma” (Pew Case Studies in International Affairs, 1997). LESSONS OF THE AGREED FRAMEWORK FOR USING ENGAGEMENT AS A NONPROLIFERATIO...

We report a general theorem on sustaining cooperation in inlinitely-repeated games when the possibility of renegotiation constrains punishments not to harm both players. This result generalizes observations recently reported by E. van Damme (Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoner’s dilemma, L Econ. Theory 47 (1989), 206217) for the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Journal of Economic Literature...

We study cooperation in economies of indefinite duration. Participants faced a sequence of prisoner’s dilemmas with anonymous opponents. We identify and characterize the strategies employed at the individual level. We report that (i) grim trigger does not describe well individual play and there is wide heterogeneity in strategies; (ii) systematic defection does not crowd-out systematic cooperat...