Competitive behaviors such as outbidding one’s rivals may be countered by the rivals’ threat of mutually destructive objections. In an Arrow-Debreu model of production economies with firms privatized by property rights, we model such hindered competitive behaviors as a coalition’s attempt to block a status quo given the threat that the outsiders of the coalition, especially those with whom the ...

The seminal contribution of Debreu-Scarf [4] connects the two concepts of core and competitive equilibrium in exchange economies. In effect, their core-equilibrium equivalence result states that, when the set of economic agents is replicated, the set of core allocations of the replica economy shrinks to the set of competitive allocations. Florenzano [6] defines the fuzzy core as the set of allo...

In this paper we examine non-parametric restrictions on counterfactual analysis in a simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. Under the assumption of timeseparable expected utility and complete markets all equilibria in this model are stationary, the Arrow-Debreu prices uniquely reveal the probabilities and discount factor and the equilibrium correspondence defined as the map from e...

We extend the Arrow–Fisher–Hanemann–Henry (AFHH) and Dixit–Pindyck (DP) option values to a game situation. By reinterpreting the AFHH option value as a change in the surplus from conservation because of the prospect of future information, we deal with a conceptual difficulty associated with the AFHH option value in the presence of strategic interactions. We then introduce the DP option value in...

We show a range of complexity results for the Ricardo and Heckscher-Ohlin models of international trade (as Arrow-Debreu production markets). For both models, we show three types of results: 1. When utility functions are Leontief and production functions are linear, it is NP-hard to decide if a market has an equilibrium. 2. When utility functions and production functions are linear, equilibria ...

Motivated by the convergence result of mirror-descent algorithms to market equilibria in linear Fisher markets, it is natural for one consider designing dynamics (specifically, iterative algorithms) agents arrive at Arrow-Debreu equilibria. Jain (SIAM J. Comput. 37(1), 303–318, 2007) reduced equilibrium computation markets bijective where everyone a seller only good and buyer bundle goods. In t...

It is well known that an equilibrium in the Arrow-Debreu model may fail to exist if a very restrictive condition called the survival assumption is not satis ed. We study two approaches that allow for the relaxation of this condition. Danilov and Sotskov (1980), and Florig (1998a) developed a concept of a generalized equilibrium based on a notion of hierarchic prices. Marakulin (1988, 1990) prop...