نتایج جستجو برای: d86

تعداد نتایج: 181  

Journal: :J. Economic Theory 2013
Zvika Neeman Gregory Pavlov

We study what kind of equilibria of which mechanisms are ex post renegotiation-proof (EPRP), i.e., robust against the possibility of ex post renegotiation under a variety of renegotiation procedures, and which social choice functions are EPRP implementable. In complete information environments with two agents only budget balanced Groves allocations are EPRP implementable, while with three or mo...

Journal: :Games and Economic Behavior 2010
Robert Dur Joeri Sol

Social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers. To attract and retain workers, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high-quality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a principal-multi-agent model where agents do not only engage in productive activities, but also in social interaction with their colleagues, which in turn cre...

2017
Avidit Acharya Juan Ortner

We study a dynamic principal-agent relationship with adverse selection and limited commitment. We show that when the relationship is subject to productivity shocks, the principal may be able to improve her value over time by progressively learning the agent’s private information. She may even achieve her first best payoff in the long-run. The relationship may also exhibit path dependence, with ...

Journal: :American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2021

This paper studies how security design affects project outcomes. Consider a firm that raises capital for multiple projects by offering investors share of the revenues. The revenue each is determined ex post through bargaining with buyer output. Thus, choice feasible payoffs game. We characterize securities achieve firm’s maximal equilibrium payoff in bilateral and multilateral negotiations. In ...

Journal: :The American Economic Review 2021

This paper studies competitive allocations under adverse selection. We first provide a general necessary and sufficient condition for entry on an inactive market to be unprofitable. then use this result characterize, active market, unique budget-balanced allocation implemented by tariff making additional trades with entrant Motivated the recursive structure of allocation, we finally show that i...

Journal: :J. Economic Theory 2010
Matthew Mitchell Yuzhe Zhang

This paper studies the design of unemployment insurance when neither the searching effort nor the savings of an unemployed agent can be monitored. If the principal could monitor the savings, the optimal policy would leave the agent savings-constrained. With a constant absolute risk-aversion (CARA) utility function, we obtain a closed form solution of the optimal contract. Under the optimal cont...

Journal: :J. Economic Theory 2010
Pierre Yared

In every period, an aggressive country seeks concessions from a non-aggressive country with private information about their cost. The aggressive country can force concessions via war, and both countries suffer from limited commitment. We characterize the efficient sequential equilibria. We show that war is necessary to sustain peace and that temporary wars can emerge because of the coarseness o...

2009
Steven Wu

Producer Protection Legislation and Termination Damages in the Presence of Contracting Frictions This study models producer protection legislation that would grant growers the right to claim damages (PPLD) if their contracts are prematurely terminated. In the absence of contracting frictions that prevent contractors from redesigning contracts to accommodate exogenous policy changes, PPLD would ...

Journal: :J. Economic Theory 2016
Alexander Frankel

This paper extends the concept of a quota contract to account for discounting and for the possibility of infinitely many periods: a discounted quota fixes the number of expected discounted plays on each action. I first present a repeated principal-agent contracting environment in which menus of discounted quota contracts are optimal. I then recursively characterize the dynamics of discounted qu...

2015
David A. Miller Kareen Rozen

We study optimal contracting in team settings where agents have many opportunities to shirk, task-level monitoring is needed to provide useful incentives, and it is difficult to write individual performance into formal contracts. Incentives are provided informally, using wasteful sanctions like guilt and shame, or slowed promotion. These features give rise to optimal contracts with underperform...

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