This paper considers an interdependent-value robust mechanism design problem, where the principal has little knowledge about agent’s belief. Although ex post incentive-compatible (EPIC) mechanisms can implement allocations without any belief, we show that, under a certain condition (order-reversing interdependence), there exists non-EPIC that achieves strictly higher expected revenue than EPIC ...

We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies. JEL classification: D72, D74, D82, C72

We show that for any mechanism there exists an equivalent dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism for social choice environments with correlated types when agent’s matrix of conditional probabilities satisfies the full rank condition. JEL classifications: D82

Article history: Laffont and Tirole's [Laffon Received 31 July 2007 Received in revised form 28 December 2007 Accepted 8 April 2008 Available online 20 April 2008 JEL classification: D82 L14

This paper studies, theoretically and experimentally, the effects of overconfidence fake news on information aggregation quality democratic choice in a common-interest setting. We show that exacerbates adverse widespread misinformation (i.e., news). then analyze richer models allow for partisanship, targeted intended to sway public opinion, signals correlated across voters (due media ownership ...

This paper uses laboratory experiments to directly test a central prediction of disclosure theory: that strategic forces can lead those who possess private information voluntarily provide it. In simple sender-receiver game, we find senders disclose favorable information, but withhold unfavorable information. The degree which is strongly related their stated beliefs about receiver actions, and a...

We analyze how voluntary disclosure of information by bidders affects the outcome optimally designed auctions. In a single-object auction environment, we assume that before revenue-maximizing auctioneer designs auction, noncooperatively choose signal structures disclose about their valuations. show an equilibrium exists in this two-stage game and every object is sold with probability one. Our m...

In the context of priority-based allocation objects, we formulate methods to compare assignments in terms their stability. We introduce three basic properties that a reasonable stability comparison should satisfy. show for any satisfying properties, top trading cycles mechanism is minimally unstable among efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms when objects have unit capacities. Our unifying ap...

Public recognition is frequently used to motivate desirable behavior, yet its welfare effects—such as costs of shame or gains from pride— are rarely measured. We develop a portable empirical methodology for measuring and monetizing social image utility, we deploy it in experiments on exercise charitable behavior. In all experiments, public motivates behavior but creates highly unequal payoffs. ...