One of the assumptions of recursive multiple-priors utility (Epstein and Schneider, J. Econ. Theory, 113(1) (2003), 1-31) is that conditional preferences at every node satisfy an intertemporal version of the multiple-priors axioms (Gilboa and Schmeidler, J. Math. Econ., 18(2) (1989) 141-153). This note weakens this assumption: Given that conditional preferences depend only on the continuations ...

The value of information is examined in a single-agent environment with unawareness. Although the agent has a correct prior about events he is aware of and has a clear understanding of his available actions and payoffs, his unawareness may lead him to commit information processing errors and to behave suboptimally. As a result, the value of information can be negative, contrasting what is true ...

In this paper we examine how increases in intertemporal price uncertainty affect the welfare of a consumer. In the preference structure of the consumer the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) are parametrically independent. We find that under empirically plausible circumstances, for each given degree of risk aversion an increase in price ...

How does commodity price volatility affect the welfare of rural households in developing countries, for whom hedging and consumption smoothing are often difficult? And when governments choose to intervene in order to stabilize commodity prices, as they often do, who gains the most? This paper develops an analytical framework and an empirical strategy to answer those questions, along with illust...

This paper analyzes the effects of buyer search costs and incomplete information, private and common knowledge of the sellers, on seller competition. It turns out that small changes in search costs may have large but quantifiable effects on pricing when the seller has good private knowledge about the buyer, but the common knowledge of the buyer valuations is lacking among the sellers. As an app...

The paper studies insurance with moral hazard in a system of contingent-claims markets. Insurance buyers are modelled as Cournot monopolists or oligopolists. The other agents condition their expectations on market prices, as in models of rational-expectations equilibrium with asymmetric information. Thereby they correctly anticipate accident probabilities corresponding to effort incentives indu...

We give a necessary and sufficient condition on memory of a player in an extensive game for equivalence between ex ante optimality and timeconsistency (for all payoff assignments). The condition is called A-loss recall and requires that each loss of a player’s memory can be traced back to some loss of memory of his own action. A-loss recall is also shown to be a necessary and sufficient conditi...

In our paper targets, by setting a reserve price, screen acquirers on their (expected) ability to generate merger-specific synergies. Both empirical evidence and many common merger models suggest that the difference between highand low-synergy mergers becomes smaller during booms. This implies that the target’s opportunity cost for sorting out relatively less fitting acquirers increases and, he...

A modern, decision-theoretic framework can help clarify important practical questions of experimental design. Building on our recent work, this chapter begins by summarizing our framework for understanding the goals of experimenters, and applying this to re-randomization. We then use this framework to shed light on questions related to experimental registries, pre-analysis plans, and most impor...

We investigate to what extent genuine social preferences can explain observed other-regarding behavior. In a dictator game variant subjects can choose whether to learn about the consequences of their choice for the receiver. We find that a majority of subjects showing other-regarding behavior when the payoffs of the receiver are known, choose to ignore these consequences if possible. This behav...