We study the emergence of urban self-governance in late medieval period. focus on England after Norman Conquest 1066, building a novel comprehensive dataset 554 towns. During Commercial Revolution (twelfth to thirteenth centuries), many merchant towns obtained Farm Grants: right self-governed tax collection and law enforcement. Self-governance, turn, was stepping stone for parliamentary represe...

We consider a self-administered organization characterized by a principal elected by the agents and establish conditions under which self-administration leads to either stronger or weaker incentives than an organization which only pursues exogenous objectives such as profit maximization. While the output of the organization that accrues to society is controlled by the effort of the agents and b...

This paper argues that self-reporting schemes whereby citizens report their noncompliance with regulation can prevent corruption in administrations. In our model, entrepreneurs must comply with regulation before undertaking a risky activity. O cials verify compliance before granting permits, and may engage in either bribery or extortion. Without a self-reporting scheme, the government tolerates...

We study a 2004 program designed to motivate Chinese bureaucrats to reduce accidental deaths. Each province received a set of `death ceilings' that, if exceeded, would impede government o cials' promotions. For each category of accidental deaths, we observe a sharp discontinuity in reported deaths at the ceiling, suggestive of manipulation. Provinces with safety incentives for municipal o cials...

Under incomplete information about (independent) private valuations of a public good, we establish sufficient conditions under which, despite the incentive to free ride on future contributors, the expected total amount of voluntary contributions is higher when agents contribute sequentially (observing prior contributions) rather than simultaneously. We establish this in a conventional framework...

This paper examines whether decentralization increases the responsiveness of public investment to local needs using a unique database from Bolivia. Empirical tests show that investment patterns in human capital and social services changed significantly after decentralization. These changes are strongly and positively related to objective indicators of need. Nationally, these changes were driven...

Corruption often creates a “briber’s dilemma”: each of the “clients” competing for a rent allocated by a government official has an incentive to pay bribes to try to obtain preferential treatment, but they would all be better off if they could mutually commit not to pay bribes. This paper uses a model of linked games to show how informal relationships among the clients may enable them to enforc...

We document evidence of corruption in Chinese state asset sales. These sales involved stakes in partially privatized firms, providing a benchmark—the price of publicly traded shares—to measure underpricing. Underpricing is correlated with deal attributes associated with misgovernance and corruption. Sales by “disguised” owners that misrepresent their state ownership to elude regulatory scrutiny...

Corruption has fierce impacts on economic and societal development and is subject to a vast range of institutional, jurisdictional, societal and economic conditions. Research indicates that corruption’s predominantly negative effects have arisen to a massive trans-border threat while creating high obstacles to sustainable and prospective development, ultimately impairing everybody’s life. This ...