Abstract   Extended Oligopoly models will be introduced and examined in which the firms might face capacity limits, thresholds for minimal and maximal moves, and antitrust thresholds in the case of partial cooperation. Similar situation occurs when there is an additional cost of output adjustment, which is discontinuous at zero due to set-up costs. In these cases the payoff functions of the...

In this paper, we consider an exchange economy à la Shitovitz (1973), with atoms and an atomless set. We associate with it a strategic market game of the kind first proposed by Lloyd S. Shapley and known as the Shapley window model. We analyze the relationship between the set of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations of the strategic market game and the Walras equilibrium allocations of the e...

This survey is organized as follows. l. lntroduction. Il. The main issues. IIl. Negishi's model. IV. Objective demand in the Cournot-Nash framework. V. Objective demand in the Bertrand-Nash framework. VI. The assumption of quasi-concavity of the profit functions. VII. Compromises between the conjectural and the objective approach. VIIL Insights into the notion of perfect competition. IX. Conclu...

We introduce a simple model of oligopolistic competition where firms first build capacity, and then, after observing the capacity decisions, choose a reservation price at which they are willing to supply their capacities. This model describes many markets more realistically than Kreps and Scheinkman’s (1983) model. We show that in this new model every pure strategy equilibrium yields the Courno...

We analyze strategic delegation in a Stackelberg model with an arbitrary number, n, of firms. We show that the n−1 last movers delegate their production decisions to managers whereas the first mover does not. Equilibrium incentive rates are increasing in the order with which managers select quantities. Letting ui denote the equilibrium payoff of the firm whose manager moves in the i-th place, w...

In the usual framework of continuum games with externalities, we substantially generalize Cournot–Nash existence results [Balder, A unifying approach to existence of Nash equilibria, Int. J.Game Theory 24 (1995) 79–94; On the existence of Cournot–Nash equilibria in continuum games, J.Math. Econ. 32 (1999) 207–223; A unifying pair of Cournot–Nash equilibrium existence results, J. Econ. Theory 10...

We consider Cournot competition in general equilibrium. Decisions firms are taken by majority voting. Naturally, interests of voters—shareholders or stakeholders—depend on their endowments and portfolios. Indeed, voters every firm concerned about the return portfolios rather than shares firm. introduce two notions local Cournot–Walras equilibria to overcome difficulties arising from non-concavi...

This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with substitute goods and product R&D. I find that R&D expenditure, prices and firms’ net profits are always higher under quantity competition than under price competition. Furthermore, output, consumer surplus and total welfare are higher in the Bertrand equilibrium than in the Cournot equilibrium if either R&D spi...

The paper studies insurance with moral hazard in a system of contingent-claims markets. Insurance buyers are modelled as Cournot monopolists or oligopolists. The other agents condition their expectations on market prices, as in models of rational-expectations equilibrium with asymmetric information. Thereby they correctly anticipate accident probabilities corresponding to effort incentives indu...

Most existing Nash-Cournot models of competition among electricity generators assume that firms behave purely Cournot or Bertrand with respect to transmission decisions by the independent system operator. Such models are unrealistic for markets in which interfaces connecting subnetworks are frequently saturated but the congestion pattern within individual subnetworks is less predictable. We pro...