Abstract In this paper I argue that there is a significant but often overlooked metaphysical distinction to be made between contextualism and contrastivism. The orthodox view contrastivism merely form of contextualism. This mistake. contextualist incompatible with certain naturalist claims about the nature concepts within whichever domain being investigated, while contrastivist compatible these...

This paper shows how to reconcile epistemic invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion. My basic proposal is that we can comfortably combine invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion by endorsing contextualism about speech acts. My demonstration takes place against the backdrop of recent contextualist attempts to usurp the knowledge account of assertion, most notably Keith ...

Just as knowledge contextualism offers a way out of skepticism in the face powerful skeptical arguments, counterfactual purports to answer many compelling arguments for thesis that most ordinary counterfactuals form ‘if A had happened, C would have happened’, are false. In this article I review few skepticism, before surveying various types contextualist responses. then discuss some recent obje...

Abstract In linguistic communication, the speaker’s utterance simultaneously generates several levels of meaning related to Grice’s distinction between what is said and implicated. Yet, there a lively debate about two notions. This study gives general overview three schools: Semantic Minimalism, Radical Contextualism, Moderate Contextualism. After surveying current controversies in these theori...

Jonathan Schaffer is sympathetic to the contextualist approach to epistemology, broadly construed, but thinks that it hasn’t got the account of the verb “knows” quite right. Contextualists are on to something, but their view needs to be reformulated to give a correct account of the way we talk about knowledge, and (he argues) the reformulated view can do a better job of developing and defending...

Suppose that Ann says, “Keith knows that the bank will be open tomorrow.” Her audience may well agree. Her knowledge ascription may seem true. But now suppose that Ben—in a different context—also says “Keith knows that the bank will be open tomorrow.” His audience may well disagree. His knowledge ascription may seem false. Indeed, a number of philosophers have claimed that people’s intuitions a...