I argue that zombies are inconceivable. More precisely, I argue that the conceivability-intuition that is used to demonstrate their possibility has been misconstrued. Thought experiments alleged to feature zombies founder on the fact that, on the one hand, they must involve ®rst-person imagining, and yet, on the other hand, cannot. Philosophers who take themselves to have imagined zombies have ...

In this paper I propose a defense of a posteriori materialism. Problems with a posteriori identity materialism are identified, and a materialism based on composition, not identity, is proposed. The main task for such a proposal is to account for the relation between physical and phenomenal properties. Composition does not seem to be fit as a relation between properties, but I offer a peculiar w...

Metaphysical modalities are definable from counterfactual conditionals, and the epistemology of the former is a special case of the epistemology of the latter. In particular, the role of conceivability and inconceivability in assessing claims of possibility and impossibility can be explained as a special case of the pervasive role of the imagination in assessing counterfactual conditionals, an ...

My response to Witmer comes in three sections: In the first I address concerns about my book's blindsight thought-experiment, remarking specifically on the role imagination plays in it, and my grounds for thinking (in the face of Witmer's doubts) that a first-person approach is valuable here. In Section Two I consider the relation of the thought-experiment to theses regarding possibility and ne...