Abstract This paper studies a one-period stochastic game to determine the optimal premium strategies of non-life insurers in competitive market. Specifically, strategy is determined by Nash equilibrium an n -player game, which each player assumed maximise expected utility terminal wealth. The wealth stochastic, since number policies and size claims are considered be random variables. total loss...

We make three contributions to the theory of contracting under asymmetric information. First , we establish a competitive analog to the revelation principle which we call the implementation principle. This principle provides a complete characterization of all incentive compatible, indirect contracting mechanisms in terms of contract catalogs (or menus), and allows us to conclude that in competi...

This study considers pricing, production and transportation decisions in a Stackelberg game between three-stage, multi-product, multi-source and single-period supply chains called leader and follower. These chains consist of; manufacturers, distribution centers (DCs) and retailers. Competition type is horizontal and SC vs. SC. The retailers in two chains try to maximize their profit through pri...

In many competitive settings consumers buy multiple product categories, and some prefer to use a single firm, generating complementary cross-category price effects. To study pricing in supermarkets, an organizational form where these effects are internalized, we develop a multi-category multi-seller demand model and estimate it using UK consumer data. This class of model is used widely in theor...

Chapter Outline Introduction 61 Background 63 Distributional Effects of Dynamic Pricing 65 Barriers to Dynamic Pricing 69 Unfairness of Flat Rate Pricing 71 Dynamic Pricing in Other Industries 73 Overcoming the Barriers to Dynamic Pricing 74 The Effect of Dynamic Pricing on Low-Income Consumers 75 Accommodating Potential Objections 77 Conclusions 78 Appendix: Quantifying the Hedging Cost Premiu...

Pricing series reflect multiple decisions (e.g., regular pricing and discounting) often made by multiple decision makers. For example, temporary price reductions (high frequency price changes) can be used to price discriminate in the short run, while regular price adjustments (low frequency price changes) reflect more strategic or long-term goals. It is therefore not implausible that the “react...

Industrial clusters are promoted by policy and generally viewed as good for growth and development, but both clusters and policies may also enable noncompetitive behavior. This paper studies the presence of non-competitive pricing in geographic industrial clusters. We develop, validate, and apply a novel screen for collusive-like behavior. We derive the screen from the solution to a partial car...

We study a game with strategic vendors (the agents) who own multiple items and a single buyer with a submodular valuation function. The goal of the vendors is to maximize their revenue via pricing of the items, given that the buyer will buy the set of items that maximizes his net payoff. We show this game may not always have a pure Nash equilibrium, in contrast to previous results for the speci...

As retail choice states reach the end of their transitional, rate-cap periods, state regulators must decide what type of default supply service to provide to customers that have not switched to a competitive retail supplier. In a growing number of states, regulators have adopted real-time pricing (RTP) as the default service for large commercial and industrial (C&I) customers. Although this tre...