In this work we use techniques from the study of samplecomplexity in machine learning to reduce revenue maximizing auction problems to standard algorithmic questions. These results are particularly relevant to designing good pricing mechanisms for sponsored search. In particular we apply our results to two problems: profit maximizing combinatorial auctions, and auctions for pricing semantically...

We introduce a novel characterization of all Walrasian price vectors in terms of forbidden overand under demanded sets for monotone gross substitute combinatorial auctions. For ascending and descending auctions we suggest a universal framework for finding the minimum or maximum Walrasian price vectors for monotone gross substitute combinatorial auctions. An ascending (descending) auction is gua...

Combinatorial auctions are used as a distributed coordination mechanism in Multiagent Systems. The use of combinatorial auctions as negotiation and coordination mechanism is especially appropriate in systems with interdependencies and complementarities such as manufacturing scheduling systems. In this work we review some updating price mechanisms for combinatorial auctions based on the Lagrangi...

It is a common belief that combinatorial auctions provide good solutions to resource-allocation in multiple-object markets with synergies. In this work we adopt a pragmatic approach to examining the revenue bounds on combinatorial and simultaneous auctions. The theoretical bounds from our previous work utilize a large number of bidders in order to show that combinatorial auctions yield a higher...

Combinatorial auctions are used in a variety of application domains such as transportation or industrial procurement using a variety of bidding languages and different allocation constraints. This flexibility in the bidding languages and the allocation constraints is essential in these domains, but has not been considered in the theoretical literature so far. In this paper, we analyze different...

As illustrated in the previous chapters, combinatorial auctions have successfully been applied to various application domains, such as the allocation of airspace system resources (Chapter 20), truckload transportation (Chapter 21) and bus routes (Chapter 22). Industrial procurement is potentially a huge application domain for combinatorial auctions, and it has turned into a topic of interest fo...

This paper presents a secure Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) scheme that does not require third-party servers, i.e., the scheme is executed only by an auctioneer and bidders. Combinatorial auctions, in which multiple goods are sold simultaneously, have recently attracted considerable attention. The GVA can handle combinatorial auctions and has good theoretical characteristics such as incentiv...

Abstract We show that a competitive equilibrium always exists in combinatorial auctions with anonymous graphical valuations and pricing, using discrete geometry. This is an intuitive easy-to-construct class of can model both complementarity substitutes, to our knowledge, it the first besides gross substitutes have guaranteed equilibrium. prove through counter-examples result tight, we give expl...