Decisions involving charitable giving often occur under the shadow of risk. A common finding is that potential donors give less when there is greater risk that their donation will have less impact. While this behavior could be fully rationalized by standard economic models, this paper shows that an additional mechanism is relevant: the use of risk as an excuse not to give. In a laboratory study...

Charities frequently rely on professional solicitors whose commissions exceed half of total donations. To understand this practice, we propose a principal-agent model in which the charity optimally offers a higher commission to a more “efficient” solicitor, raising the price of giving significantly. Outsourcing is, therefore, profitable for the charity only if giving is very price-inelastic. Th...

This article focuses on the bundling of products with promised contributions to charity. Two lab experiments and one field study are conducted that compare the effectiveness of promised donations to charity in promoting ‘‘practical necessities’’ (e.g., a box of laundry detergent) to their effectiveness in promoting ‘‘frivolous luxuries’’ (e.g., a hot fudge sundae). The results suggest that char...

Motivated thinking leads people to perceive similarity between the self and ingroups, but under some conditions, people may recognize that personal beliefs are misaligned with the beliefs of ingroups. In two focal experiments and two replications, we find evidence that perceived belief similarity moderates ingroup favoritism. As part of a charity donation task, participants donated money to a c...

The paper serves as background material for the review of debated issues and standpoints in the theory and application of Islamic economics, IE; and for discussion of fruitful research avenues in application of IE to modern economies. The focus is on six areas: (1) theory: links between IE and mainstream economics; while topics (2) to (6) treat applications of the given directives in Islamic ec...