This paper models a legislature in which the same agenda setter serves for two periods, showing how he can exploit a legislature (completely) in the first period by promising future benefits to legislators who support him. In equilibrium, a large majority of legislators vote for the firstperiod proposal because they thereby maintain the chance of belonging to the minimum winning coalition in th...

Cooperation in public good games is greatly promoted by positive and negative incentives. In this paper, we use evolutionary game dynamics to study the evolution of opportunism (the readiness to be swayed by incentives) and the evolution of trust (the propensity to cooperate in the absence of information on the co-players). If both positive and negative incentives are available, evolution leads...

Reciprocity norm in the U.S. Congress and state assemblies has been studied extensively. By contrast, obedience norms frequently observed in many legislative bodies outside the United States have received relatively little attention. We seek to provide an evolutionary account of obedience norms. Drawing on a detailed observation of the legislative game in the Korean National Assembly, we model ...

In this note, we introduce two distinct incentive mechanisms that support dynamic intra-group cooperation in the context of prisoner’s dilemma payoffs. The first mechanism involves a reward structure—a carrot—that supports both triadic and tripartite group relations. The second mechanism involves a punishment structure—a stick—that supports tripartite group relations. We also discuss how these ...

To what degree do different incentives substitute for or complement each other in the manufacturing sector? Although this question has received considerable attention on the plant level, relatively little information is available on the subject for the U.S . manufacturing sector as a whole. This study presents the results of a small survey designed to elicit information so as to determine the c...