_ .Ttf. paper exaTines the wetting by water of low-densitypolyethylene frlm modified at the poll'rnerwater (a_ir) interface by introduction of polar organic functionaf groupi (carboxylic acids, aminei, and others). Water/qolyn.er contact angles were determined for each of these intcrfaces; for interfaces containing acidic or basic functional gro_up:, tfre c91!9gt angle was determined as a funct...

We compare the behavior of car mechanics and college students as sellers in experimental credence goods markets. Finding largely similar behavior, we note much more overtreatment by car mechanics, probably due to decision heuristics they learned in their professional training. JEL classifications: C91, D82, C72

We examine experimentally how a person’s generosity depends on the degree of anonymity between giver and recipient, as well as on the parties’ sexes. Less is given when the giver is paid on stage rather than in private; men receive less than women; fewer men than women give non-zero amounts. The results suggest that it may be problematic to organize experimental data in terms of social distance...

We are the first paper to analyse and confirm the existence and extent of rational informational herding and rational informational contrarianism in a financial market experiment, and to compare and contrast these with the equivalent irrational phenomena. In our study, subjects generally behaved according to benchmark rationality. Moreover, traders who should herd or be contrarian in theory are...

The Big Carrot: High Stake Incentives Revisited This paper provides an empirical demonstration of high stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. It shows that, when both positive (carrot) and negative (stick) incentives are available, the former are more effective than the latter. Specifically, it is shown that beliefs in heaven are much more relevant than beliefs in hell when estima...

Donors may often not be sure whether a recipient really deserves their help. Does this uncertainty deter generosity? In an experiment we find that, to the contrary, under most specifications of uncertainty, dictators give more, compared with the donation the same dictator makes to a recipient they know to have the expected value of the endowment with certainty. They are particularly concerned a...

We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which first-order stochastically dominates the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric auctions, in particular whether the weak bidder behaves more aggressively than the strong, and the...

We are the first paper to analyse and confirm the existence and extent of rational informational herding and rational informational contrarianism in a financial market experiment, and to compare and contrast these with the equivalent irrational phenomena. In our study, subjects generally behaved according to benchmark rationality. Moreover, traders who should herd or be contrarian in theory are...

Pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) is the standard stability concept in network formation. It assumes myopic behavior of the agents in the sense that they do not forecast how others might react to their actions. Assuming that agents are farsighted, related stability concepts have been proposed. We design a simple network formation experiment to test these theories. Our results prov...