We introduce a model of bargaining among groups, and characterize a family of solutions using a Consistency axiom and a few other invariance and monotonicity properties. For each solution in the family, there exists some constant α ≥ 0 such that the "bargaining power" of a group is proportional to cα, where c is the cardinality of the group. Subject classification: JEL C71, C78

We study optimal policy experimentation by a committee. consider dynamic bargaining game in which committee members choose either risky reform or safe alternative each period. When no redistribution is allowed, the unique equilibrium outcome generically inefficient. allowed (even small amounts), there always exists an that supports for any voting rule without veto players. With players, however...

This paper studies how security design affects project outcomes. Consider a firm that raises capital for multiple projects by offering investors share of the revenues. The revenue each is determined ex post through bargaining with buyer output. Thus, choice feasible payoffs game. We characterize securities achieve firm’s maximal equilibrium payoff in bilateral and multilateral negotiations. In ...

This paper is a survey of the work in the Nash program for coalitional games, a research agenda proposed by Nash (1953) to bridge the gap between the non-cooperative and cooperative approaches to game theory. Journal of Economic Literature Classification: C71, C72, C78.

We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings. JEL classification...

This paper examines evolutionary equilibrium selection in bargaining models. We show that random best-response and continuous best-response learning dynamics give rise to (different) simple sufficient conditions for identifying outcomes as stochastically stable. This allows us to characterize the implications of these dynamics in simple bargaining games.  2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved...

Abstract Background Spontaneous coronary artery dissection (SCAD) is one of the causes acute syndrome, myocardial infarction (MI) and sudden death. Although gold standard for diagnosis invasive angiography, Coronary Computed Tomography Angiography (CCTA) a new useful tool follow–up (FU). Treatment could involve conservative or an approach with percutaneous intervention (PCI) bypass grafting. AI...

This paper considers time exchanges via a common platform (e.g., markets for exchanging units, positions at education institutions, and tuition waivers). There are several problems associated with such markets, e.g., imbalanced outcomes, coordination problems, inefficiencies. We model as matching construct non-manipulable mechanism that selects an individually rational balanced allocation maxim...