Weighted committee games generalize n-player simple voting games to m ≥ 3 alternatives. The committee’s aggregation rule treats votes anonymously but parties, shareholders, members of supranational organizations, etc. differ in their numbers of votes. Infinitely many vote distributions induce only finitely many distinct mappings from preference profiles to winners, i.e., non-equivalent committe...

We characterize the positional social preference correspondences (spc) satisfying qualified majority property for any given threshold. also spcs minimal property. next evaluate probability that Borda, plurality and antiplurality fulfil two aforementioned properties under Impartial Anonymous Culture assumption in presence of three four alternatives various sizes society. Our results show Borda s...

Abstract I numerically compute Borda-optimal, i.e., optimal based on the Borda count as normative criterion, labour-income tax schedules for United States. do so in context of a Mirrlees-style model with quasilinear preferences and constant elasticity labour supply. Because is defined finitely many alternatives, computations restrict attention to finite subset set continuous, piecewise linear (...

In a party-based election, the voters are grouped into parties and all voters of a party are assumed to vote according to the party preferences over the candidates. Hence, once the party preferences are declared the outcome of the election can be predicted. However, in the actual election, the members of some “instable" parties often leave their own parties to join other parties. We introduce t...

We consider the problem of control in elections where an election chair seeks to either make a designated candidate win, or prevent her from winning, via actions such as adding, deleting, or partitioning either candidates or voters. These scenarios have been studied for many voting systems and the related control problems have been classified in terms of their complexity. However, for one of th...

Weighted committees allow shareholders, party leaders, etc. to wield different numbers of votes or voting weights as they decide between multiple candidates by a given social choice method. We consider that apply scoring methods such plurality, Borda, antiplurality rule. Many induce the same mapping from committee members’ preferences winning candidates. The respective weight equivalence classe...

COMBINING RANKED CLASSIFIER HYPOTHESES MERIJN VAN ERP AND LAMBERT SCHOMAKER NICI, P.O.Box 9104, 6500 HE Nijmegen, the Netherlands fM.vanErp, s homakerg ni i.kun.nl The Borda ount is a simple yet e e tive method of ombining rankings. In pattern re ognition, lassi ers are often able to return a ranked set of results. Several experiments have been ondu ted to test the ability of the Borda ount and...

Face recognition has awide range of possible applications in surveillance, human computer interfaces and marketing and advertising goods for selected customers according to age and gender. Because of the high classification rate and reduced computational time, one of the best methods for face recognition is based on Gabor jet feature extraction and Borda count classification. In this paper, we ...