Non-Proprietary Mutual Fund (Load Fund). XYZ MF Large Cap Fund, Class A Class B Class C. [ • ]% sales load as applicable. [ • ]% dealer concession. [ • ]% of transactional fee Extent considered in annual bonus. [ • ]% expense ratio. [ • ]% 12b–1 fee, revenue sharing (paid by fund/affiliate). [ • ]% of ongoing fees. Extent considered in annual bonus. N/A ................. Breakpoints (as applica...

SEPTEMBER 2010 CATARACT & REFRACTIVE SURGERY TODAY EUROPE 25 A stigmatism is an optical defect that may lead to shadowing, loss of contrast sensitivity, distortion, blurred vision, and ghosting. There are two types of astigmatism, regular and irregular. Irregular astigmatism is often caused by a corneal scar or scattering in the crystalline lens. It is estimated that astigmatism of more than -0...

JULY/AUGUST 2010 CATARACT & REFRACTIVE SURGERY TODAY EUROPE 15 H ydrophilic IOLs have many appealing characteristics, such as good optical clarity, good biocompatibility, a low incidence of dysphotopias, and good compressibility allowing implantation through small incisions. Many of these characteristics are due to the water content of hydrophilic lenses, which can vary from 18% to 30%. In cont...

FEBRUARY 2011 CATARACT & REFRACTIVE SURGERY TODAY EUROPE 17 C ataract surgery has transitioned from a standardized, lens-based procedure to refractive surgery. This evolution has required the assembly of different parts, like a puzzle, to optimize postoperative distance and near UCVA. New phaco platforms, instruments, and IOLs, along with the new techniques and the right attitude, have enabled ...

We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on both the actual and the optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Explicit incentive contracts that are optimal according to self-interest theory become inferior when some agents value fairness. Conversely, implicit bonus contracts that are doomed to fail among purely selfish actors provide powerful incenti...

Teacher effort, a critical component of education production, has been ignored in the literature due to measurement difficulties. I use a principal-agent model, data on NC public elementary schools, and the state’s unique accountability system that rewards teachers for year-over-year school-level academic growth, to distill effort from absence data and capture its effect on student achievement....

In this paper we extend a performance measure sensitive Markovian bisimulation congruence based on yield and bonus rewards that has been previously defined in the literature, in order to aggregate more states and transitions while preserving compositionality and the values of the performance measures. The extension is twofold. First, we show how to define a performance measure sensitive Markovi...

Firms often use both objective/verifiable and subjective/non-verifiable performance measures to provide employees with effort incentives. We study a principal/multi-agent model in which a verifiable team-based performance measure and nonverifiable individual performance measures (one for each agent) are available for contracting. A problem with tying rewards to non-verifiable measures is that t...

Two incentive experiments were conducted in different online access panels. Experiment 1 was carried out in a commercial market research panel. It examined whether three different types of promised incentives (redeemable bonus points, money lottery and gift lottery), four different amounts of bonus points or raffled money, and two different denominations of raffled money influenced response qua...