Most existing Nash-Cournot models of competition among electricity generators assume that firms behave purely Cournot or Bertrand with respect to transmission decisions by the independent system operator. Such models are unrealistic for markets in which interfaces connecting subnetworks are frequently saturated but the congestion pattern within individual subnetworks is less predictable. We pro...

In a differentiated products setting with n varieties it is shown, under certain regularity conditions, that if the demand structure is symmetric and Bertrand and Cournot equilibria are unique then prices and profits are larger and quantities smaller in Cournot than in Bertrand competition and, as n grows, both equilibria converge to the efficient outcome at a rate of at least l/n. If Bertrand ...

1. Main instructions for the Double Dictator Game with agreement or no agreement ................2 1.1 Double Dictator Game without agreement....................................................................... 2 1.2 Double Dictator Game with agreement on ‘action 10’ .................................................. 13 2. Main instructions for the Bertrand Game with agreement or no agreement...

In this paper, we investigate the surfaces generated by binormal motion of Bertrand curves, which is called Razzaboni surface, in Minkowski 3-space. We discussed the geometric properties of these surfaces in M according to the character of Bertrand geodesics. Then, we define the Razzaboni transformation for a given Razzaboni surface. In other words, we prove that there exists a dual of Razzabon...

We investigate the welfare effect of union activity in a relatively new oligopoly model, the Cournot-Bertrand model, where one firm competes in output (a la Cournot) and the other firm competes in price (a la Bertrand). The Nash equilibrium prices, outputs, and profits are quite diverse in this model, with the competitive advantage going to the Cournot-type competitor. A comparison of the resul...

• Two classical models in the theory of oligopoly are those of Coumot (1838) and Bertrand (1883). In both models the equilibrium concept is the noncooperative equilibrium of Nash (1950). In the former firms set quantities. In the latter prices are the strategy variables. In a duopoly situation where firms produce a homogeneous good and marginal costs are constant and equal for both firms, the B...

Abstract A discrete fracture network (DFN) model based on non-parametric kernel density estimators (KDE) and directional-linear statistics is developed. The provides a characterization of the with distributions orientation size jointly. solution to Bertrand paradox used for calculation disk sizes from trace lengths, latter calculated intersection disks highwall faces by triangulation. Poisson p...