A new game theoretic analysis of finite horizon, complete information bargaining is advanced. The extensive form reflects an attempt to model unstructured negotiations, in which the negotiants can gain no artificial advantage from the details of the bargaining protocol. Conditions are identified under which the game is dominance solvable in the sense that iterative deletion of weakly dominated ...

Shapley’s impossibility result indicates that the two-person bargaining problem has no non-trivial ordinal solution with the traditional game-theoretic bargaining model. Although the result is no longer true for bargaining problems with more than two agents, none of the well known bargaining solutions are ordinal. Searching for meaningful ordinal solutions, especially for the bilateral bargaini...

In this paper, we apply an Evolutionary Algorithm (EA) to solve the Rubinstein’s Basic AlternatingOffer Bargaining Problem, and compare our experimental results with its analytic game-theoretic solution. The application of EA employs an alternative set of assumptions on the players’ behaviors. Experimental outcomes suggest that the applied co-evolutionary algorithm, one of Evolutionary Algorith...

Note: This is a only a draft version, so there could be flaws. If you find any errors, please do send email to [email protected]. A more thorough version would be available soon in this space. The Nash bargaining problem represents one of the earliest and most influential results in cooperative game theory. Given two rational and intelligent players and a set of feasible allocations from a...

Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may affect the balance of power between the original members even if their number of votes and the decision rule remain constant. Some of the original members may actually gain even if voters are bargaining over a fixed budget. We show that this phenomenon can occur as an equilibrium of a non-cooperative bargaining game based on the...

We study a bargaining game in which a player needs to pay a fixed cost in the beginning of every period t, if he wants to stay in the game in period t + 1, in case a deal has not been reached by the end of t. Whether a player pays this cost is his private information. Every efficient payoff vector can be approximated in equilibrium. When costs of delay vanish, the value of every symmetric stati...

This experimental study investigates two bargaining games with twosided incomplete information between a seller and a buyer. In the first game with no outside options many subjects do not use the incomplete information to their advantage as predicted. We find that a model with adjusting priors better explains observed behavior. The second game gives the buyer the option to buy via search or ret...

This paper analyzes a model of bilateral bargaining in the presence of information flow revealing one’s bargaining posture. The equilibrium outcome of our bargaining game converges to that of the unique equilibrium of its a continuous-time limit, as players can make offers arbitrarily frequently. We characterize the equilibrium of this limiting game and develop some comparative statics regardin...

We establish a general n-player link between non-cooperative bargaining and the Nash solution. Non-cooperative bargaining is captured in a reduced form through the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) stability concept. A stable set always exists. Moreover, if the utility set has a smooth surface, then any stable set converges to the Nash bargaining solution. Finally, the equivalence of stationary eq...

The objective of this research is to tackle bargaining problems with Evolutionary Algorithms (EA). EA have been proved effective for a wide variety of problems. In this paper, we apply EA to solve Rubinstein’s Basic Alternating-Offer Bargaining Problem whose game-theoretic solution is known. Experimental outcomes suggest that EA are able to generate convincing approximations of the theoretic so...