I prove that ‘Disagreement Point Convexity’ and ‘Midpoint Domination’ characterize the Nash bargaining solution on the class of twoplayer bargaining problems and on the class of smooth bargaining problems. I propose an example to show that these two axioms do not characterize the Nash bargaining solution on the class of bargaining problems with more than two players. I prove that the other solu...

In many real world negotiations, from wage contract bargaining to product liability disputes, the bargaining parties often interact repeatedly and have the option of seeking outside judgement. This paper studies a model of repeated bargaining with a third party to analyze how and why bargaining postures endogenously evolve over time. A privately informed long-lived player bargains with a sequen...

We study the role of consumers’ psychological bargaining costs associated with the decision to bargain in a retail setting. First, we use a simple model to show how a retailer’s optimal pricing strategy (fixed pricing vs. bargaining) varies with consumers’ bargaining costs and the retailer’s marginal costs. We then prove how these fixed bargaining costs can be nonparametrically identified separ...

This paper presents a logical axiomatization of bargaining solutions. A bargaining situation is described in propositional logic and the bargainers’ preferences are quantified in terms of the logical structure of the bargaining situation. A solution to the n-person bargaining problems is proposed based on the maxmin rule over the degrees of bargainers’ satisfaction. We show that the solution is...

We study equilibrium prices and trade volume in a market with n identical buyers and a seller who initially commits to some capacity. Sales are sequential and each price is determined by strategic bargaining. A unique subgame perfect equilibrium exists. It is characterized by absence of costly bargaining delays and each trade is settled at a different price. Prices increase with n and fall in t...

This paper explores logical properties of belief-revision-based bargaining solution. We first present a syntax-independent construction of bargaining solution based on prioritized belief revision. With the construction, the computation of bargaining solution can be converted to the calculation of maximal consistent hierarchy of prioritized belief sets. We prove that the syntax-independent solut...

Despite the fact that bargaining plays an important role in business communications, it is largely neglected in e-business systems. In this paper a conceptual model that integrates bargaining into web-based e-business systems will be developed starting from an informal characterisation of the bargaining process. Bargaining can be formalised as a two-player game, and integrated with the co-desig...

We establish a general n-player link between non-cooperative bargaining and the Nash solution. Non-cooperative bargaining is captured in a reduced form through the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) stability concept. A stable set always exists. Moreover, if the utility set has a smooth surface, then any stable set converges to the Nash bargaining solution. Finally, the equivalence of stationary eq...

We propose a simple bargaining procedure, the equilibrium of which converges to the Walrasian allocation as the agents become increasingly patient. We thus establish that the competitive outcome obtains even if agents have market power and are not price-takers. Moreover, where in other bargaining protocols the final outcome depends on bargaining power or relative impatience, the outcome here is...

One of the most important decisions that a firm faces in managing its supply chainis a procurement decision: selecting suitable suppliers among many potential compet-ing sellers and reducing the purchase cost. While both auction and bargaining havebeen extensively studied in the literature, the research that combines both auction andbargaining is limited. In this paper, we consi...