Abstract We develop a Nash equilibrium problem representing perfectly competitive market wherein all players are subject to the same source of uncertainty with an unknown probability distribution. Each player—depending on her individual access and confidence over empirical data—builds ambiguity set containing family potential distributions describing uncertain event. The different is not necess...

We show that, as soon there exists a positive bequest motive, sufficiently risk averse individuals should not purchase annuities. This suggests therefore a new explanation for the low level of annuitization, which is valid even if one assumes perfect markets. A model calibration accounting for temporal risk aversion generates an optimal level of annuitization of only 25% of the total savings.

Here we consider a pragmatic sample-based motion planning approach for a robot operating in a fixed, rangeonly beacon field. We define and calculate entropy values for regions of interest and provide a method for finding “safe,” risk averse, low-entropy paths between these regions. We include an experimental, real-world assessment of the approach.