The effects of public policy programs which aim at internalizing spill-overs due to successful innovation are analyzed in a sequential double-sided moral hazard doublesided adverse selection framework. The central focus lies in analyzing their impact on contract design. We show that in our framework only ex post grants are a robust instrument for implementing the first-best situation, whereas t...

A partly heuristic attempt at exploring long-run policies aimed at a second-best compromise between ex ante risk-sharing efficiency and ex post productive efficiency. Wage subsidies for low-skilled workers financed by taxes on high wages are advocated, together with improved risk sharing between capital and labour, between generations and between the countries belonging to EMU. The scope of the...

Background Previous studies have mostly focused on socio-demographic and health-related determinants of health-related behaviors. Although comprehensive health insurance coverage could discourage individual lifestyle improvement due to the ex-ante moral hazard problem, few studies have examined such effects. This study examines the association of a comprehensive set of factors including socio-d...

In this paper, we depict and analyze simple models of moral hazard, namely “operating moral hazard” and “investing moral hazard.” First we assume that a corporation exists primarily for the benefit of their shareholders. Then, moral hazard occurs when managers choose an option knowingly that is not optimum for shareholders. We evaluate the loss to shareholders in terms of cash flow to them in t...

moral hazards are the result of an expansive range of factors mostly originating in the patients’ roles. the objective of the present study was to investigate patient incentives for moral hazards using the experiences of experts of basic iranian insurance organizations. this was a qualitative research. data were collected through semi-structured interviews. the study population included all exp...

In a model of dual agency problems where borrower-lender and bank-nonbank incentives may conflict, we predict a hockey stick relation between bank skin in the game and covenant tightness. As bank participation declines covenant tightness increases until reaching a low threshold, at which point the relation sharply reverses and covenant protection is removed with a commensurate increase in sprea...

the purchase of insurance may cause the insureds to increase the costs of insurance companies, compared to their estimation of costs. if after the demand of insurance services, the loss ratio of insurance companies increases because of consumer behavior, moral hazard will be evident. in this paper, after introducing the literature, the presence of moral hazard in iran insurance company is teste...