Abstract. We model costly interactions (contracts) between managers and investors. We suggest that globalization of production and favorable technology shock of the 1990s altered economic environment of managerinvestor interactions. These changes exacerbate agency conflict due to the increased managerial gains from ex post reneging, and, simultaneously, decreased costs of managerial reneging. I...

This dissertation analyzes where and when experienced investors add value to startups. Building on the resource-dependence theory and the relational view of the firm, I argue that the positive effect of investor experience on startup performance is stronger when the startup faces a more uncertain environment. The first essay predicts a greater effect of investor experience early in the life cyc...

Financial markets reveal information through which firm managers increase the value of equity, e.g., by improving investment decisions. With debt, however, such decisions are not necessarily socially efficient. We demonstrate that investors’ endogenous information acquisition, acting through this feedback channel, attenuates risk-shifting but amplifies debt overhang. The most ex-ante inefficien...

Résumé : We study the specific rationale governing entrepreneur-investor relations in young ventures which raise equity capital from different investor types in pursuit of a strong growth strategy. Special emphasis is put on the governance process through which investors and entrepreneurs interact in a complex setting, where an entrepreneur faces at least two distinct investor types (business a...

Using a new measure of shareholder inattention constructed from exogenous industry shocks to institutional investor portfolios, we find that firms with distracted shareholders are associated higher cost debt. This effect is stronger for more powerful CEOs, information asymmetry, and those operating in less competitive product markets. Further testing suggests the inattention-cost debt relation ...

We consider the problem of a mutual fund manager that maximizes the present value of expected fees and has to decide the level of fee to impose on the fund. The fee will be paid by a risk averse investor that maximizes expected utility over final wealth. This investor can invest either in an indexed fund or in a managed fund. The manager has superior ability and, as a result of it, the fund off...

Portfolio selection is a usual multiobjective problem. This paper will try to deal with the optimum portfolio for a private investor, taking into account three criteria: return, risk and liquidity. These objectives, in general, are not crisp from the point of view of the investor, so we will deal with them in fuzzy terms. The problem formulation is a goal programming (G.P.) one, where the goals...

This paper analyzes a model of moral hazard in portfolio management. Managers wish to earn the higher fees associated with active management but are averse to the effort of identifying superior trading strategies through research. Previous research has focused on contracts which offer explicit incentives. In this paper I address optimal contracting between an investor and a portfolio manager wh...