Paradoxes are amazing puzzles in philosophy (and mathematics), and they can be interesting when turned into proofs and theorems (in mathematics and logic). For example, Russell's paradox, which collapsed Frege's foundations of mathematics, is now a classical theorem in set theory, and implies that no set of all sets can exist. Or, as another example, the Liar paradox has turned into Tarski's th...

In Philosophical Logic, the Liar Paradox has been used to motivate the introduction of both truth value gaps and truth value gluts. Moreover, in the light of “revenge Liar” arguments, also higherorder combinations of generalized truth values have been suggested to account for so-called hypercontradictions. In the present paper, Graham Priest’s treatment of generalized truth values is scrutinize...

In „Undeniably Paradoxical: Reply to Jacquette,‟ John Barker offers a criticism of my recent Polish Journal of Philosophy essay, „Denying the Liar.‟ If Barker is right, then I have correctly but unsurprisingly shown only that a construction other than the liar is not genuinely paradoxical, while leaving the liar paradox itself, properly so-called, completely untouched. Barker twice in the essay...

Jean Buridan has offered a solution to the Liar Paradox, i.e., to the problem of assigning a truth-value to the sentence “What I am saying is false.” It has been argued that this solution is either 1) ad hoc since it would only apply to self-referencing sentences (Read 2002 ), or else 2) weakens his theory of truth, making his “a logic without truth” (Klima 2008, Dutilh Novaes 2011 ). Against 1...

In this paper I respond to Jacquette’s criticisms, in (Jacquette, 2008), of my (Barker, 2008). In so doing, I argue that the Liar paradox is in fact a problem about the disquotational schema, and that nothing in Jacquette’s paper undermines this diagnosis.

Logical systems with classical negation and means for sentential or propositional self-reference involve, in some way, paradoxical statements such as the liar. However, the paradox disappears if one replaces classical by an appropriate non-classical negation such as a paraconsistent one (no paradox arises if the liar is both true and false). We consider a non-Fregean logic which is a revised an...

This paper revisits Buridan’s Bridge paradox (Sophismata, chapter 8, Sophism 17), itself close kin to the Liar paradox, a version of which also appears in Bradwardine’s Insolubilia. Prompted by occurrence Cervantes’s Don Quixote, I discuss and compare four distinct solutions problem, namely “just false” conception, “contingently true/false” theory, “both true view, then “neither simpliciter nor...

in al-ta‘liqat–which is most likely a collection of avicenna’s lectures– it is intended to answer to a paradox concerning the knowledge of the substance. this paradox can be reconstructed this way: if, by knowing something, its quiddity comes to mind, then with knowing a substance its quiddity–which is a substance–comes to mind. conversely, according to peripatetic philosophy, knowledge is a qu...