We propose a bargaining process with alternating proposals as a way of solving non-cooperative games, giving rise to Pareto efficient agreements which will, in general, differ from the Nash equilibrium of the constituent games. JEL classification: C72; C73; C78.

We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies. JEL classification: D72, D74, D82, C72

An overview is given of the utilization of strategic market games in the development of a game theory based theory of money and financial institutions. JEL Classifications: C72, C73, E44

How to compensate people who provide relevant information to a decision-maker who faces uncertainty? This paper suggests some compensation rules. These are studied both in a cooperative and a noncooperative environment. JEL codes: C71, C72, D89.

This paper proposes a discrete analogue of concavity appropriate for potential games with discrete strategy sets. It guarantees that every Nash equilibrium maximizes a potential function. JEL classification: C72.

In a previous essay, we developed a simple (in)efficiency measure for matrix games. We now address the difficulties encountered in assessing the usefulness and accuracy of such a measure. JEL Classifications: C63, C72, D61

We extend the result from Bossert and Sprumont (2013) that every single-valued choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable via strict preferences to the case of choice correspondences via weak preferences. JEL Classification Numbers: C72; D70

We generalize permissibility (Brandenburger, 1992) to allow for any suitably defined model of preference and definition of possibility. We also prove that the generalized solution concept characterizes rationality, caution, and common “belief” of rationality and caution. JEL classification: C72; D81

By introducing the concepts of implicit coalitions and con‡ict of interests in a multiple-player context, this paper generalizes some theorems on policy invariance and equilibrium existence and uniqueness for LQ policy games. JEL: C72, E52, E61

We give examples of strategic interaction which are beneficial for players who follow a "middle path" of balance between pure selfishness and pure altruism. JEL Classification: C70, C71, C72, C79.