The objective of the paper is to study how wholesale price and revenue sharing contracts affect operations and marketing decisions in a supply chain under different dynamic informational structures. We suggest a differential game model of a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a single retailer that agree on the contract parameters at the outset of the game. The model includes key oper...

With the development of e-commerce, many wholesale suppliers establish direct channels competing with their retailers. Such competition is often referred to as supplier encroachment. Previous studies assume the perfect rationality of retailers. However, supplier encroachment may trigger the fairness concerns of the retailers as a supplier is also a competitor of its retailer if the supplier enc...

I our paper about optimal reverse pricing mechanisms [Spann M, Zeithammer R, Häubl G (2010) Optimal reverse-pricing mechanisms. Marketing Sci. 29(6):1058–1070] (hereafter, ORPM), some of the mathematical derivations implicitly assume that the name-your-own-price seller interprets the outside-market posted price p differently than the buyers. This note shows that all of the qualitative results i...