This paper investigates inventory management in a multi channel distribution system consisting of one manufacturer and an arbitrary number of retailers that face stochastic demand. Existence of the pure Nash equilibrium is proved and parameter restriction which implies uniqueness of it is derived. Also the Stackelberg game where the manufacturer plays a roll as a leader is discussed. Under spec...

This work deals with subsidy transfer from a manufacturer to a retailer through the distributor in cooperative advertising. While the retailer engages in local advertising, the manufacturer indirectly participates in retail advertising using advertising subsidy which is given to the distributor, who in turn transfers it to the retailer. The manufacturer is the Stackelberg game leader; the distr...

Significant progress has been made recently in the following two lines of research in the intersection of AI and game theory: (1) the computation of optimal strategies to commit to (Stackelberg strategies), and (2) the computation of correlated equilibria of stochastic games. In this paper, we unite these two lines of research by studying the computation of Stackelberg strategies in stochastic ...

We consider settings in which voters vote in sequence, each voter knows the votes of the earlier voters and the preferences of the later voters, and voters are strategic. This can be modeled as an extensive-form game of perfect information, which we call a Stackelberg voting game. We first propose a dynamic-programming algorithm for finding the backward-induction outcome for any Stackelberg vot...

Inspired by successful deployments of Stackelberg Security Game in real life, researchers are working hard to optimize the game models to make them more practical. Recent security game work on wildlife protection makes a step forward by taking the possible cooperation among attackers into consideration. However, it models attackers to have complete rationality, which is not always possible in p...

Previous work shows that reputation results may fail in repeated games with long-run players with equal discount factors. We restrict attention to stage games where two players, with equal discount factors, move sequentially. A pure Stackelberg action is assumed to exist. One and two sided reputation results are provided. If one of the players is a Stackelberg type with positive probability, th...

In this paper, we experimentally investigate the extended game with action commitment of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). In their duopoly game, ...rms can choose their quantities in one of two periods before the market clears. If a ...rm commits to a quantity in period 1 it does not know whether the other ...rm also commits early. By waiting until period 2, a ...rm can observe the other ...rm’s pe...

Given a prediction of opponent behavior in a general-sum two-player normal form game, it is difficult to select a strategy that balances the opportunity to use the prediction to inform one’s action with the risk of becoming predictable. We propose Restricted Stackelberg Response with Safety (RSRS), a novel way of generating such a strategy. RSRS uses an r-safe Stackelberg equilibrium in a modif...

considered supply chain in this article consists of one vendor and multiple retailers where the vendor applies vendor managed inventory. considering vendor as a leader and retailers as followers, stackelberg game theory is applied for modeling and analyzing this system. a general mixed integer nonlinear model is developed which can optimizes the performance of the system under revenue sharing c...