D. Bauer, A. Borgland, B. Cabrera, F. Calaprice, J. Cooley, P. Cushman, T. Empl, R. Essig, E. Figueroa-Feliciano, R. Gaitskell, C. Galbiati, S. Golwala, J. Hall, R. Hill, A. Hime, E. Hoppe, L. Hsu, E. Hungerford, R. Jacobsen, M. Kelsey, R. F. Lang, W. H. Lippincott, B. Loer, S. Luitz, V. Mandic, J. Mardon, J. Maricic, R. Maruyama, D. N. McKinsey, R. Mahapatra, H. Nelson, J. Orrell, K. Palladino...

We examine whether economies constructed using experimentally measured preferences (for risk) tend to suffer from aggregation pathologies (like nonexistence and multiplicity of equilibrium) cautioned by the Sonnenschein–Mantel–Debreu theorem. show that should be expected arise frequently in homogeneous exchange economies, but dwindle eventually disappear as grow diverse. When subjects actually ...

Consider an arbitrary Bayesian decision problem in which the preferences of each agent are private information. We prove that the utility costs associated with incentive constraints typically decrease when the decision problem is linked with independent copies of itself. This is established by first defining a mechanism in which agents must budget their representations of preferences so that th...

An equilibrium in a game theoretic setting a la Debreu (Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. (I.S.A. 38 (1954). 886893) and Shafer-Sonnenschein (.I. Mar/z. Econ. 2 (1975), 345-348) with a broader structure is proved. In particular, our framework is general enough to encompass both the Aumann (Economefrica 34 (1966), 1-17) economy of perfect competition and the nonordered preferences setting of MasCole11 (J. M...

It is routine to demonstrate in the exchange economy framework that small changes of individual preferences and endowments always result in small changes of the derived excess demand functions as one should expect. Though being as desirable for reasons of the consistency of the whole approach, however, a precise proof of the converse direction so far is still open to question. The present paper...

We consider the problem of choosing a subset of a finite set of indivisible objects (public projects, facilities, laws, etc.) studied by Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991). Here we assume that agents’ preferences are separable weak orderings. Given such a preference, objects are partitioned into three types, “goods”, “bads”, and “nulls”. We focus on “voting rules”, which rely only on this p...