In this paper, we consider a network of agents producing a positional good; an agent’s utility for the good is a function of both his intrinsic value for the good and his status, or production level relative to the production levels of his neighbors. We demonstrate that the set of Nash equilibria of our game form a complete lattice, and that natural best-reply dynamics from certain initial conf...

We study competitive diffusion games on graphs introduced by Alon et al. [1] to model the spread of influence in social networks. Extending results of Roshanbin [8] for two players, we investigate the existence of pure Nash equilibria for at least three players on different classes of graphs including paths, cycles, grid graphs and hypercubes; as a main contribution, we answer an open question ...

The influence of migration on the stochastic dynamics of subdivided populations is still an open issue in various evolutionary models. Here, we develop a self-consistent mean-field-like method in order to determine the effects of migration on relevant nonequilibrium properties, such as the mean fixation time. If evolution strongly favors coexistence of species (e.g., balancing selection), the m...

This paper shows that subsidy can naturally emerge as part of the equilibrium strategy of an innovator of a cost-reducing innovation in a Cournot oligopoly when the innovator is endowed with combinations of upfront fee and royalty. It is further shown that there are robust regions where the social welfare is higher in subsidy-based licensing compared to the regime where licensing involving subs...

We develop a model of elections in proportional representation electoral systems in which the number of candidates running for office, and the differentiation in ideology and quality among candidates are jointly determined in equilibrium. We show that in symmetric equilibria (i) candidates invest more to increase their quality when more candidates run for office; (ii) changes in the cost of run...

Several game forms are given for implementing general social choice correspondences (SCC,' s) which satisfy Haskin' s conditions of monotonicity and No Veto Power. The game forms have smaller strategy spaces than those used in previously discovered mechanisms: the strategy for an individual consists of an alternative, two subsets (of alternatives), and a player number. For certain types of econ...

In this paper we trait hemivariational inequality systems. In certain case, this problem can be reduced to study a hemivariational inequality. Several applications are given as Browder and Hartmann-Stampacchia type results and Nash equilibrium point theorems. MSC 2000. 35J60, 49J35.

As a first application of Theorem 0.1 we deduce the concentration of measure property of P� that was alluded to in the first chapter. The claim is simply that with very high probability every Lipschitz-continuous function is very close to its mean, regardless of the value of the ambient dimension �. One can obtain a crude version of this assertion by appealing to the Poincaré inequality of Nash...

A problem of the provision of a discrete public good is considered. All members in the society are homogeneous and they decide simultaneously whether to contribute to the provision. Contribution cost per person is …xed and non-refundable. Because of the free-rider problem, ine¢ ciency in the provision is inevitable, even in the most e¢ cient symmetric Nash equilibrium. However, when we add a pr...