Abstract What is the philosophical role of an historical account how someone, or some people, came to believe value as they do? I consider proposals, due Bernard Williams and David Wiggins, according which such might either vindicate subvert our believing valuing we do. suggest reasons for scepticism about those at least when construed providing a fundamental means assessing cases valuing. The ...

This article reviews the popular reasons for the belief that dwarf elliptical galaxies and (ordinary) elliptical galaxies are distinct and separate species. They include: light–profile shape (or similarly image concentration); the magnitude–central surface brightness diagram; the magnitude–effective surface brightness diagram (or similarly the magnitude–effective radius diagram); and the Fundam...

The color feature could be well represented in a feature and shape is a distinguishable feature which can make coarse discriminations quickly. Based on those reasons, we present an efficient image retrieval system to consider simultaneously accuracy and performance by combining color moment with shape contexts in this paper. The shape rotation has significant influence on the similarity measure...

Background and Aim: Haller cells are one of the anatomical variations in the orbital area, which are important in endoscopic surgical procedures and have a role in the pathogenesis of some diseases including sinusitis and chronic craniofacial pain. The frequency of Haller cells has been reported in a wide range, which can be attributed to several factors. The purpose of this study was to determ...

Philosophers have often noted a contrast between practical and theoretical reasons when it comes to cases involving equally balanced reasons. When there are strong for A-ing, some incompatible option, B-ing, the agent is permitted make an arbitrary choice them, having sufficient reason A B. But evidence P ~ P, one isn’t simply believe or other. Instead, must withhold belief, neither believing t...

What is it to have a reason? According to one common idea, the Factoring Account, you have a reason to do A when there is a reason for you to do A which you have—which is somehow in your possession or grasp. In this paper, I argue that this common idea is false. But though my arguments are based on the practical case, the implications of this are likely to be greatest in epistemology: for the p...

Since at least 1930, theorists working in moral philosophy and normativity more generally have recognized the importance of accounting for trade-offs in normative theories of what we ought to do.1 The most common way to do this is to appeal to contributory or pro tanto reasons. The thought is that the reasons for and against the options open to the agent interact and compete—in highly complex w...