• Sellers distribute goods • Buyers purchase some quantity Tâtonnement mechanism • A " Hill Climbing " approach Utility Functions • Describe a player's preferences • Specify a quantity for all prices Protocol • Sellers set the initial price • Buyers pledge quantity at price • Equilibrium sets the final price Real World Market Applications • Tokyo Grain Exchange (itayose) Debate on Applicability...

We analyze the variation of prices in a model of an exchange market introduced by Kakade et al. [11], in which buyers and sellers are represented by vertices of a bipartite graph and trade is allowed only between neighbors. In this model the graph is generated probabilistically, and each buyer is connected via preferential attachment to v sellers. We show that even though the tail of the degree...

This paper introduces a new model of exchange: networks, rather than markets, of buyers and sellers. It begins with the empirically motivated premise that a buyer and seller must have a relationship, a “link,” to exchange goods. Networks buyers, sellers, and the pattern of links connecting them are common exchange environments. This paper develops a methodology to study network structures and e...

We analyse a bargaining game in which one party, called the buyer, has the option of choosing the sequence of negotiations with other participants, called sellers. When the sequencing of negotiations is confidential and the sellers’ goods are highly complementary, efficient, non-dissipative equilibria exist in which the buyer randomizes over negotiation sequences. In these equilibria, the buyer...

This paper analyses price competition between two firms producing horizontally and vertically differentiated goods. These are assumed to be credence goods, as consumers can hardly ascertain the quality of the commodities. We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique price equilibrium and we characterize it. To illustrate the model, we adapt it to represent a newspapers’ indust...

This paper deals with two-sided matching market with two disjoint sets, i.e. the set of buyers and the set of sellers. Each seller can trade with at most with one buyer and vice versa. Money is transferred from sellers to buyers for an indivisible goods that buyers own. Valuation functions, for participants of both sides, are represented by strictly increasing functions with money considered as...

A standard double auction market collects bids from traders and matches them to find the most efficient allocation, assuming that the value of unsold items remains unchanged. In the market for perishable goods, sellers suffer a loss when they fail to sell their goods, because their salvage values are lost when the goods perish. To solve this problem, we investigate the design of an online doubl...

We introduce the concept of Market Equilibria related to game theory. In the market, there exists sellers which sell divisible goods and buyers who have a desire to purchase some set of goods. Each buyer places a value on each of the goods in his list that relates to the importance of purchasing that specific good. At market equilibrium, no party (seller or buyer) has incentive to deviate from ...

We consider the problem of splitting an order for R goods, R ≥ 1, among a set of sellers, each having bounded amounts of the goods, so as to minimize the total cost of the deal. In deal splitting with packages (DSP), the sellers offer packages containing combinations of the goods; in deal splitting with price tables (DST), the buyer can generate such combinations using price tables. Our problem...

The advent of keyword advertising raises many interesting questions regarding consumer search behavior, firms’ advertising strategy, and the ensuing market dynamics. Our research investigates whether advertisers’ bidding strategies for keywords differ across search, experience, and credence product categories, and examines the possible drivers of these differences. In particular, we examine the...