In July 2003, computer scientists from Johns Hopkins and Rice Universities released a security analysis of software purportedly from a direct recording electronic (DRE) touchscreen voting machine of a major voting-system vendor. The study drew public attention to a long-simmering controversy about whether current DREs are vulnerable to tampering that could influence the outcome of an election. ...

We describe information security requirements for a secure and functional Internet voting scheme. Then we present the voting scheme with multiple parties; this voting scheme satisfies all these security requirements. In this scheme, the voter gets a signed key from the registrar, where the registrar signs the key as blinded. The voter uses this signed key during the voting period. All other par...

The complexity of voting procedures, and their variations from country to country, make it challenging to design a secure electronic voting system. In most of the usual proposals, the security of the system relies mainly on a blackbox voting machine. Meanwhile, the most advanced proposals base their security arguments on (complicated) cryptographic protocols, e.g. blind signatures or homomorphi...

Rapid world-wide growth in Internet and Web use has stimulated many initiatives aimed at applying information and communication innovations to create what has been called a “digital” of “electronic democracy”. Over the last years, the field of secure voting schemes has attracted much attention from researchers. Since many security requirements are involved, some of them are contradictory, there...

Among the many issues in the ongoing national discussion about the Internet is its use in the voting process. Because voting determines who runs the government and entails two absolute requirements—the secret ballot and security from fraud—the stakes are higher than for many other transactions routinely conducted via the Internet. Public confidence about Internet security is increasing, but man...

Civitas is the first electronic voting system that is coercion-resistant, universally and voter verifiable, and suitable for remote voting. This paper describes the design and implementation of Civitas. Assurance is established in the design through security proofs, and in the implementation through information-flow security analysis. Experimental results give a quantitative evaluation of the t...

Recent advances indicate that quantum computers will soon be reality. Motivated by this ever more realistic threat for existing classical cryptographic protocols, researchers have developed several schemes to resist “quantum attacks.” In particular, electronic voting (e-voting), relying on properties of mechanics been proposed. However, each these proposals comes with a different and often not ...

The complexity of voting procedures make it challenging to design a secure electronic voting system. In many proposals, the security of the system relies mainly on a black box voting machine. Meanwhile, the most advanced proposals base their security arguments on (complicated) cryptographic protocols, e.g. blind signatures or homomorphic schemes. Canard and Traoré proposed cryptographic primiti...

Remote Internet voting systems still suffer from many security problems which rely on the clients, the servers, and the network connections. Denial-ofservice attacks and viruses still belong to the most challenging security issues. Projects and studies like the “Voting Technology Project” of CALTECH and MIT or SERVE of the US Department of Defense set up to gain experience evidence many of the ...