W e consider a supply chain with a supplier that sells to a retailer under a revenue-sharing arrangement. Demand is uncertain and unobservable to the supplier. We assume that the retailer is rational, that is, the retailer behaves opportunistically and underreports sales revenues to the supplier whenever such underreporting is profitable. Assuming the supplier has the ability to audit the retai...

A supply chain is a set of suppliers, manufactures and distributors, which are linked together. The first chain is a supplier and the last one is customers. What is the most important in supply chain are highquality products by the least cost and the most benefit. In this regard, each input and output and intermediate have unit price and unit cost information. The cost-minimization and the prof...

Revenue Assurance describes a methodology to increase a company’s income by determining where revenue gets lost, and to maximize their profits by eliminating revenue leakage and lowering operating costs. Especially in times of increasing data volume and more and more complex business and operational systems infrastructure, it is a challenge to find methods for detecting revenue leakage and its ...

We propose and analyze spillover-partitioning call admission control (CAC) for servicing multiple service classes in mobile wireless networks for revenue optimization with quality of service (QoS) guarantees. We evaluate the performance of spillover-partitioning CAC in terms of execution time and optimal revenue obtainable by comparing it with existing CAC algorithms, including partitioning, th...

We propose and analyze spillover-partitioning call admission control (CAC) for servicing multiple service classes in mobile wireless networks for revenue optimization with quality of service (QoS) guarantees. We evaluate the performance of spillover-partitioning CAC in terms of execution time and optimal revenue obtainable by comparing it with existing CAC algorithms, including partitioning, th...

The aim of this paper is to deal with the problem of coordination for online markets where a seller registers to an online market to sell an item. The seller and the owner of the market then form an alliance to generate revenue through online sales. However, the efficiency and stability of the alliance highly relies on the contract that specifies the way to split the revenue and costs over the ...

We study correlated equilibria and coarse equilibria of simple first-price single-item auctions in the simplest auction model of full information. Nash equilibria are known to always yield full efficiency and a revenue that is at least the second-highest value. We prove that the same is true for all correlated equilibria, even those in which agents overbid – i.e., bid above their values. Coarse...

Set-asides and subsidies are used extensively in government procurement and resource sales. We analyze these policies in an empirical model of US Forest Service timber auctions. The model fits the data well both within the sample of unrestricted sales used for estimation, and when we predict (out-of-sample) outcomes for small business set-asides. Our estimates suggest that restricting entry sub...